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QUIRIN REVISITED

A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT AND CARL TOBIAS*

INTRODUCTION

Six decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ex parte Quirin, 1
in which the Justices determined that President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt possessed the requisite constitutional authority to institute and
use a military comm1ss1on.
That military comm1ss10n
contemporaneously tried, found guilty, and recommended sentences,
which the Chief Executive promptly imposed on, eight Nazi saboteurs.
Before the commission ruled, the Supreme Court rejected the
defendants' petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated an
Executive Order (Bush Order) that authorized the establishment and
application of military commissions as well as purported to eliminate
whatever jurisdiction federal courts might have by statute and to deny
federal court access to individuals prosecuted or detained for terrorism. 2
The Bush administration substantially premised that the Order and
jurisdiction-stripping proviso on Ex parte Quirin. It has also invoked
the opinion when adopting related measures that implicate the war on
terrorism and when litigating major terrorism cases.
We recently argued that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the
Bush Order exceeded the president's lawful authority, 3 a result
necessitated by the U.S. Constitution4 and by the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 5 Our previous
work explicitly left unaddressed, as beyond its scope, any evaluation of

*
A. Christopher Bryant, Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Carl Tobias, Beckley Singleton Professor,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We wish to thank
Raquel Aldana, Margaret Sanner, and Ingrid Brunk Wuerth for valuable suggestions,
Judy Canter for processing this article, as well as Beckley Singleton and James E.
Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are ours.
1.
317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Court issued this full opinion three months after a
brief per curiam order. See id. at 18. ·
2.
See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 921 (2001), reprinted in IO U.S.C.A. § 801 (West Supp.
2002) [hereinafter Bush Order].
3.
See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373 (2002).
4.
See u .s. CONST. arts. I & Ill.
343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3.
5.
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what issues might be cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding to review
ongoing detention or a final judgment imposed under the Bush Order. 6
The government will almost certainly assert that a federal court
entertaining a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus filed by, or on
behalf of, someone whom the Bush Order covers, may only determine
whether a military commission has valid jurisdiction over the person.
This idea was foreshadowed when White House Counsel Alberto R.
Gonzales observed that the Bush administration would submit to a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, only insofar as the petitioner
challenged the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction. 7 The White
House Counsel and additional upper-echelon governmental officials base
the limitation, the Bush Order, and similar antiterrorism initiatives on

Ex parte Quirin.
We believe, however, that the ruling may not support such a
circumscribed view of the jurisdiction that a federal habeas corpus court
would exercise today. Rather, Quirin must be understood vis-a-vis its
historical context, which includes the strikingly underdeveloped nature
of federal habeas corpus at that time. Since 1942, the Justices have
dramatically enlarged federal habeas corpus proceedings' scope. Before
this date, the fact of adjudication by a competent tribunal alone would
sustain the writ's denial, yet federal habeas corpus courts now
frequently resolve substantive challenges to the manner in which
admittedly lawful tribunals conducted proceedings. One instructive
example is that a few years before Quirin, a trial court's failure to
provide counsel for an indigent criminal defendant would only rarely
have supported a petition for the writ. By sharp contrast, modem
federal habeas corpus courts frequently grant relief to petitioners
afforded lawyers whom judges later find rendered ineffective assistance.
We suggest that Quirin' s correct interpretation emphasizes the Supreme
Court's decision to exercise jurisdiction and to resolve the case on the
merits-perhaps most significantly the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
claims.
In short, the profound growth of federal habeas corpus over the last
sixty years, the opinion's unusual facts, and the quite narrow holding in
the Quirin Court's ultimate determination must guide contemporary
application of the precedent. Thus, our research finds that federal
courts have power not only to assess military commissions' validity in
the abstract but also to review whether their treatment of particular
defendants satisfied the Constitution.
6.

Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3, at 377 n.10. See generally Bush Order,

supra note 2.
7.
See Alberto R. Gonzales, Mania/ Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.
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Part I of this Article evaluates the Bush Order that created the
tribunals and ostensibly nullified federal court jurisdiction, while briefly
explaining why the President lacks constitutional authority to preclude
this jurisdiction and canvassing his administration's reliance on Quirin.
Part II then scrutinizes the decision and ascertains that the ruling should
be confined to its peculiar facts. Part III next details federal habeas
corpus's evolution since the 1940s. Finally, Part IV asserts that Quirin
must be modernized to conform with twenty-first century habeas corpus
law and concludes by surveying the types of issues that might be
cognizable in a habeas corpus court, even though an anachronistic,
unduly rigid and insupportably overbroad construction of Quirin may
appear to prohibit their merits disposition.
I.

THE BUSH ORDER AND QUIRIN

The November 2001 Bush Order, which authorized the
establishment and use of military commissions, while purportedly
abolishing federal court jurisdiction, deserves rather brief treatment here
because certain applicable issues have received extended discussion
elsewhere. 8 However, some exploration is warranted, as that analysis
should improve understanding of the Bush administration's dependence
on the Quirin case and its relevance to the Bush Order's constitutionality
and application, especially in the context of federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush promulgated an Executive
Order that authorized the creation and deployment of military
commissions as well as ostensibly abrogated federal court jurisdiction
over tribunal proceedings; the Bush administration in essence grounded
that Order and its attempt to preclude federal court jurisdiction on the
Quirin opinion, Article II delegated powers, and Congress's September
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution. 9
Numerous observers have found that the President does not have the
authority to eliminate federal court jurisdiction, a conclusion ~ictated by
Articles I and III and by the Supreme Court's Youngstown holding,

8.
See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3. See generally Laura A. Dickinson,
Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions,
International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1412-35
(2002); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, lll YALE L.I. 1259 (2002); Symposium, Youngstown at Fifty: A
Symposium, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2002).
9.
See Bush Order, supra note 2; see also Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, ll5 Stat. 224 (2001).
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although military tribunals may be legitimate in certain situations, such
as extraterritorial prosecutions that result from declared wars. 10
Most relevant for the questions that this Article addresses, the Chief
Executive, Cabinet members and a significant number of other topranking public figures have employed the Quirin decision to substantiate
related actions in the war on terrorism and to pursue and defend crucial
terrorism litigation. The country's elected leaders have proffered the
ruling in a highly generalized manner. When President Bush justified
the Order, he alluded to the opinion by mentioning how the Roosevelt
administration had implemented an analogous World War II initiative;
President Bush stated that "[n]on-US citizens who plan and/or commit
mass murder are . . . unlawful combatants" and they might receive trials
before military commissions, if those proceedings would foster the
"national-security interest. " 11 On November 14, 2001, Vice President
Richard Cheney similarly cited the Quirin decision and the application
of military tribunals as the major precedents for establishing military
commissions, while he remarked that the entities should try the
individuals responsible for the terrorist attacks who do not "deserve the
same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American
citizen going through the normal judicial process." 12
The same day, at a press conference, Attorney General John D.
Ashcroft subscribed practically verbatim to the notions that the VicePresident had expressed by recounting tribunals' "very substantial
history," Supreme Court recognition (most importantly in Quirin) that
the entities are valid, and his personal opinion that "foreign terrorists
10.
See, e.g., Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3; Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649 (2002); Gonzales, supra note 7. We do not
address the geographic scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in this Article; we
leave for another day such questions as those raised in A. F. Al Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the privilege of litigation did not extend to
aliens in military custody outside of U.S. territory).
11.
Wayne Washington, Fighting Terror Legal Considerations: FDR Move
Cited in Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al; see Mike Allen, Bush Defends
Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at Al4. President Bush
subsequently justified tribunals by urging Americans to remember that those who would
be tried "are killers. They don't share the same values that we share." President's
Exchange with Reporters in Alexandria, Virginia, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 469
(Mar. 25, 2002).
12.
See Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/
news-speeches/speeches/vp20011l14-1.html; see also Interview by Vice President
Richard Cheney with Gloria Borger, 60 Minutes II (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www. whitehouse. gov /vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114.html.
See generally Michal Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 434 (2002).
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who commit war crimes against the United States ... are not entitled to
and do not deserve the protections of the American Constitution." 13
Three weeks later, the Attorney General correspondingly proffered
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee: the "Quirin case upheld
the use of commissions in the United States against enemy belligerents,"
while the Justices exercised "habeas corpus jurisdiction to decide" on
the tribunal's legitimacy and "whether the belligerents were actually
eligible for trial under the commission. " 14 In a June 10, 2002
Department of Justice (DOJ) briefing, Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson observed that the U.S. government had detained Jose Padilla
"under the laws of war as an enemy combatant," and the Deputy
Attorney General relied on the Quirin precedent as "clear Supreme
Court [authority] for such a detention. " 15
DOJ Assistant Attorneys General, who are discharging lead
responsibility to pursue the war on terrorism, have invoked the World
War Il determination. The Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division, Michael Chertoff, when defending the Bush Order's
promulgation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supplied numerous
arguments: the language used was "virtually identical" to that in the
Roosevelt Proclamation and Order; commission application has enjoyed
a long history, which the Assistant Attorney General traced; the
Supreme Court recognized tribunals' constitutionality with the Quirin
opinion; and Chertoff's acknowledgement that commission deployment
"in the United States would be subject to habeas review by the Federal
courts. " 16 The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Policy, Viet D. Dinh, whom some observers consider the "chief
architect of Ashcroft's aggressive new approach to law enforcement,"
has similarly claimed that the venerated American tradition of

13.
Attorney General John Ashcroft & INS Commissioner Ziglar,
Announcement of INS Restructuring Plan (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://
www .usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll _ I4.htm; see also John Turley,
Military Tribunal Rules Put Our Values to Test, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2002, at 7A.
Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing
14.
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, I07th Cong. 322, 327 (2002) [hereinafter
Preserving Our Freedoms} (statement of Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft). The Attorney
General recounted the venerable history of commissions once again. Id.
15.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Conference on the Arrest of Abdullah al
Mujahir, Also Known as Jose Padilla (June 10, 2002) (statement of Deputy Att'y Gen.
Larry Thompson), transcript available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/rights/law/
02061001.htm; see infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
16.
See Preserving Our Freedoms, supra note 14, at 52 (statement of Assistant
Att'y Gen. Michael Chertoft); see also infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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employing military commissions sustained the Bush Order's institution. 17
The Assistant Attorney General emphasized how the Roosevelt
administration had applied tribunals during World War II, while Dinh
cited Quirin for the propositions that the "Supreme Court has
unanimously upheld" the entities' validity and the President's authority
to convene them. 18
Officials who head the Department of Defense (DOD) have
proffered several analogous concepts which support the Bush Order and
the March 21, 2002 DOD regulations that implement it. 19 Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz tendered a statement for the Senate Armed Services
Committee, observing that "[m]ilitary commissions have been used in
times of war since the founding of this Nation" and alluding specifically
to the Roosevelt administration prosecution of the eight Nazi saboteurs;
both officers claimed the "Supreme Court upheld" tribunals' legitimacy
in Quirin. 20 The Deputy Secretary elaborated by suggesting that the
"President does have a lot of authority; [however, the World War II
decision] was precisely a case of where the courts reviewed whether that
authority was properly exercised" and concluded that it had been. 21 The
Department General Counsel, William J. Haynes II, submitted testimony
that reinforced the perspectives that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz enunciated
and elaborated: the Bush Order was the same as the Roosevelt Order
and was not intended to modify Supreme Court habeas corpus scrutiny. 22
Moreover, the General Counsel invoked the Quirin precedent when
substantiating the March 2002 department regulations, while he argued
that "Presidents have detained enemy combatants in every major conflict

17.
See Siobhan Gorman, The Ashcroft Doctrine, NAT'L J., Dec. 21, 2002, at
3712, 3713; see also Eric Lichtblau with Adam Liptak, On Terror, Spying and Guns,
Ashcroft Expands Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al.
18.
See Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 399, 405-06 (2002); see also infra notes 26-34 and
accompanying text (recounting DOI reliance on Quirin in major terrorism litigation).
19.
Bush Order, supra note 2; Military Commission Order No. 1 (U.S. Dep't
of Defense Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/
mcol.pdf [hereinafter DOD Order]; see Turley, supra note 13.
20.
See Depanment of Defense's Implementation of the President's Military

Order on Detention Treatment and Trial by Military Commission of Cenain Noncitizens
in the War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., 107th
Cong. 9, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sec'y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld
& Deputy Sec'y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz).
21.
Id. at 68; see also Nat Hentoff, Spinning the Military Tribunals: A Mere
Pretense of Legal Process, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 2, 2002, at 27.
22.
See Hearing, supra note 20, at 17 (statement of DOD Gen. Counsel
William J. Haynes II); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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in the Nation's history" and that federal courts have affirmed the power
of chief executives to deploy military tribunals. 23
White House Counsel Gonzales also relied on Quirin for the
propositions that the Justices have "consistently upheld" military
commissions' application, and he clearly recognized that the terms
incorporated in the Bush Order were derived from wording of the
Roosevelt administration Proclamation and Order, phraseology which
the Supreme Court construed as permitting habeas corpus review. 24 The
White House Counsel concomitantly asserted that any "habeas corpus
proceeding in a federal court" that challenges actions under the Bush
Order that authorize trial of non-U. S. citizens by military commissions
would be limited to reviewing "the lawfulness of the commission's
jurisdiction. " 25
The Justice and Defense Departments have correspondingly placed
substantial dependence on the Quirin opinion when litigating a
significant percentage of the terrorism cases. These include most
prominently Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which was pursued in the Eastern
District of Virginia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, as well as Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, which is proceeding
before the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit. 26 For
example, the brief submitted by the government to assert its position in
one Hamdi appeal contended: "given the constitutionally limited role of
the courts in reviewing military decisions, courts may not second-guess
the military's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant
and should be detained as such. " 27 Fourth Circuit Chief Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson Ill, trenchantly reformulated this argument in an appellate
court opinion: the United States "thus submits that we may not review at
all its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that
23. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DOD Responds to ABA Enemy
Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002) (quoting Letter from William Haynes II, DOD General
Counsel, to Neal Sonnett, Chair, ABA Task Force on Enemy Combatants (Sept. 23,
2002)),
available
at
http://www. defenselink. mil/news/Oct2002/
b10022002_bt497-02.html. The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed these ideas in
Hamdi. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Turley, The
Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (2002).
24.
See Gonzales, supra note 6. See generally Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3,
at 394-95 n.85.
25.
See Gonzales, supra note 6. See generally Tom Brune, Military Couns to
Vary on Rules, NEWSDAY, Dec. 1, 2001, at A2. Senators' views similar to the
administration's are in the hearings cited supra notes 14, 16, 20.
26.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002);
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), adhered to
upon reconsideration, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
27.
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
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its determinations on this score are the first and final word. " 28
However, the Fourth Circuit flatly denied as premature the
government's request to dismiss the petition and elaborated: "In
dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping
proposition-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained
indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so. " 29
When the Fourth Circuit remanded the matter, District Judge Robert
Doumar asked "what, if any, constitutional protections Hamdi was
entitled to," and counsel for the United States "responded that the
Constitution applied to the same extent as 'it did to the individual who
was alleged to be an American citizen in the Quirin case. "' 30 "Upon
further questioning by the court," the lawyer conceded that this person
"was afforded access to counsel and the opportunity to defend himself
before a military tribunal, " 31 while the trial judge found it apparent that
the Quirin petitioner received a "significantly broader measure of due
process than Hamdi has received thus far" in part because he had been
confined to the Norfolk Naval Brig without an attomey. 32 The district
court that resolved the Padilla litigation similarly rejected the
government's argument that Padilla should not have access to counsel, 33
but the judge did find "the logic of Quirin bears strongly on this case,"
extensively citing the decision that "recognized the distinction between
lawful and unlawful combatants" and that "[u]nlawful combatants are
likewise subject to capture and detention. "34
A large number of public officials, especially those who hold
cabinet-level, and additional upper-echelon, Bush administration
positions, therefore, have invoked the World War II precedent of Ex
parte Quirin. These figures, namely President Bush and certain topranking legal officers, have depended on the ruling for many important
propositions in numerous contexts and for ideas which the opinion may
not support.
This Article's next Part, thus, considers Ex parte Quirin, the World
War II decision on which the President and his aides extensively relied
when issuing the November 2001 Bush Order and when fighting the war
28.
See id.
29.
Id. The Fourth Circuit did extensively cite to Quirin for ideas, such as the
following: "And in World War II, the [Supreme] Court stated in no uncertain terms that
the President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the
courts." Id. at 282 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25).
30.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532 (E.D. Va. 2002).
31.
Id.
32.
See id. at 529, 532.
33. · See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
34.
Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added). See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31.
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on terrorism. We review whether the case supports the notions for
which the Bush administration proffers the opinion and determine that
Quirin cannot sustain most of them. For instance, the President and his
assistants at once extend the decision far beyond its circumscribed, sui
generis facts and narrowly-confined holding to substantiate broad
concepts, such as indefinite detention of U.S. citizens and great judicial
deference vis-a-vis the Executive, even while those public officials
apparently ignore federal habeas corpus's exponential growth over the
last sixty years. Perhaps as troubling, a few courts have already
subscribed to the administration's interpretation of the precedent.
II.

ANALYSIS OF EX PARTE QUIRIN

In evaluating Quirin, we first assess its unique factual context. We
then explore the decision's legal analysis and holding, and we explain
why many phenomena should limit the reach of Quirin. These include
the speed with which the United States prosecuted the saboteurs and the
Supreme Court resolved their appeals; the difficulties of rationalizing the
full opinion after the government depended on a hastily-assembled,
laconic per curiam order to execute six of the petitioners; as well as
improper exogenous pressures, most critically from President Roosevelt,
and questionable internal ones, principally from Justice Felix
Frankfurter. The determination was also narrow, and its author, Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, intentionally wrote a circumscribed opinion,
which many observers suggest should be narrowly read.

A.

The Facts in Quirin

The unusual facts that underlie Ex pane Quirin warrant
considerable exploration in this Article because they support a confined
reading of the holding. Our recitation of the pertinent facts derives
substantially from the factual rendition that the Supreme Court decision
articulated and the perspectives enunciated by informative secondary
sources, which have carefully and thoroughly scrutinized the relevant
particulars. 35
After the United States had declared war against the German Reich
in 1941, Adolph Hitler demanded expeditious action against the nation
35.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-22; see also Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme
Coun Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL.
L. REv. 59 (1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61
(1996). See generally LoUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL (2003); EUGENE
RACHLIS, THEY CAME To KILL: THE STORY OF EIGHT NAZI SABOTEURS IN AMERICA
(1961).
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on U.S. soil. 36 The German High Command, therefore, devised a plan
that included military and propaganda objectives because the scheme
required that the saboteurs destroy bridges, aluminum factories, and
railroads as well as train stations and department stores throughout the
United States. 37 Over the course of a month in spring 1942, experts
instructed the saboteurs on detonators, explosives, invisible writing, and
other relevant techniques at a special training installation outside
Brandenburg, Germany. 38
Four of the saboteurs then proceeded to a seaport that was located
in Occupied France and boarded a submarine that traveled across the
Atlantic Ocean and planted them and a supply of explosives and
detonators at Amagansett Beach, Long Island early on the morning of
June 13, 1942. 39 They landed, dressed wholly or partly in German
Marine Infantry uniforms, which they buried upon reaching shore, and
thereafter journeyed to New York City wearing civilian clothes. 40 Four
additional saboteurs departed on another submarine from the identical
French port. This second group came ashore, dressed in German
Marine Infantry caps and transporting similar destructive paraphernalia,
at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida under the cover of darkness on June I7. 41
These individuals buried their caps and the explosive materials, donned
civilian dress, proceeded to Jacksonville, and subsequently dispersed to
various destinations across the United States. 42
At least two saboteurs decided that they might be saved through
betrayal of their remaining colleagues, and one traveled to Washington,
D.C., where he provided the FBI with a thorough confession. 43 By June
27, accordingly, the FBI had placed all eight saboteurs in custody. 44

36.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; see also Danelski, supra note 35, at 61. See
generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 4; Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case
History, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131, 132 (1943).
37.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 54, 54-55 (1942); Danelski, supra note 35,
at 61, 63.
38.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Danelski, supra note 35, at 63. See generally
FISHER, supra note 35, at 1-23.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 37, at 54; Danelski, supra
39.
note 35, at 63.
40.
See supra note 39. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 25-32.
41.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 37, at 54; Danelski, supra
note 35, at 64.
See supra note 41. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 35-38.
42.
See Belknap, supra note 35, at 62; Bernstein, supra note 36, at 136;
43.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 64-65.
44.
See supra note 44. The FBI issued misleading press releases that suggested
that its diligence led to the arrests. These issuances marked the beginning of
"government control on information about" the case and its successful use for
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The FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, orchestrated a press conference that
day to announce their capture, while some members of the media
beseeched the government to impose prompt, ruthless retribution. 45
In a June 30 memorandum, which President Roosevelt prepared for
Attorney General Francis Biddle, the President articulated his personal
opinions that the individuals being held surely "are just as guilty as it is
possible to be" and that "[o]ffenses such as these are probably more
serious than any offense in criminal law. " 46 The President, therefore,
concluded that "[t]he death penalty is called for by usage and by the
extreme gravity of the war aim and the very existence of our American
Government," urging that the people captured "be tried by court
martial. " 47 The Attorney General first conferred with the Secretary of
War, Henry Stimson, and the Judge Advocate General, Myron Cramer,
and then suggested to the Chief Executive that a military commission be
assembled to try the saboteurs. 48 Biddle specifically recommended trial
by commission because he thought this approach would be rather
expeditious, make it easier to prove the charge of violating the law of
war, and permit the death penalty's imposition. 49 The Attorney General
also harbored concerns related to secrecy, in particular that there not be
embarrassing revelations about the facility with which the saboteurs had
landed on U.S. shores and the comparatively inept FBI treatment of the
matter at the war's outset. so
On July 2, Roosevelt promulgated an Executive Order that
instituted a military commission, appointed its members, the prosecutors
and the defense counsel; established the procedures the tribunal would
use to conduct the proceeding; and prescribed review of the trial record

propaganda purposes. Danelski, supra note 35, at 64-65; accord Preserving Our
Freedoms, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
45.
Belknap, supra note 35, at 62-63; Bernstein, supra note 36, at 137;
Danelski, supra note 35, at 65.
46.
See Memorandum for the Attorney General, President Roosevelt to
Attorney General Biddle (June 30, 1942) (President's Secretary's Files: Departmental
File: Justice Department, 1940-1944) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.).
See id. See generally Jonathan Turley, Quirin Revisited: The Dark History
47.
of a Military Tribunal, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at Al7.
48.
See Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle, to President Roosevelt
(June 30, 1942) (President's Official File (OF)5036: Nazi Spies, 1942-1945) (on file
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
49.
See Belknap, supra note 35, at 63-64; Danelski, supra note 35, at 66; see
also FISHER, supra note 35, at 49-51.
50.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 66; see also Belknap, supra note 35, at 66-67;
Katya! & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1280-81. See generally supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
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and any commission judgment or sentence. 51 The Order deviated from
requirements in the Articles of War by authorizing the admission of
evidence which had probative value for a reasonable person; conviction
and imposition of a death penalty sentence on a two-thirds, rather than a
unanimous, vote; and direct transmittal of the record, judgment and
sentence to the Chief Executive for review. 52 Biddle informed Roosevelt
that the departures prescribed "should save a considerable amount of
time," but they would also facilitate the saboteurs' conviction as well as
imposition of the death penalty. 53 The same day, the President issued a
Proclamation that ostensibly closed the federal courts to "persons who
are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United
States . . . and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing
to commit sabotage, espionage . . . or violations of the laws of war. " 54
Biddle intimated to the President that this July 2 Proclamation would
"produce the same practical results" for the saboteurs as suspending the
habeas corpus writ, yet it would avoid suspension's "broad policy
questions. " 55
On the next day, the Army Judge Advocate General filed with the
military tribunal charges that the eight saboteurs had violated the law of
war: Article 81 of the Articles of War, which implicated relieving the
enemy; Article 82, which involved spying; as well as conspiracy to
commit the abovementioned offenses. 56 Soon thereafter, the commission
began the trial, which was held in complete secrecy in a converted FBI
assembly room with blacked-out windows in the DOJ building. 57 The
proceeding continued for three weeks. The lawyers for the saboteurs,
Army Colonels Cassius Dowell and Kenneth Royall, doubted that the
Order and Proclamation were constitutional or valid and decided that

51.
Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942); see also
Danelski, supra note 35, at 67.
52.
Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942). See generally
Danelski, supra note 35, at 67.
53.
See Danelski, supra note 35, at 67; Memorandum, supra note 48.
54.
See Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1938-1943); see also Quirin,
317 U.S. at 22-23. See generally FISHER, supra note 33, at 50-53; supra notes 2, 9, and
accompanying text.
55.
Memorandum, supra note 48; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Ex parte
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see also WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 32-42 (1998)
(discussing Merryman); Belknap, supra note 35, at 65 (citing Memorandum, supra note
48).
56.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23; see also Bernstein, supra note 36, at 141-43;
Danelski, supra note 35, at 67.
57.
Belknap, supra note 35, at 66. The government stated that the commission
was conducting the trial in secret for security reasons. See id.; Espionage: 7 Generals
v. 8 Saboteurs, TIME, July 20, 1942, at 15.
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they would contest both in federal court. 58 However, the defense
attorneys, as military officers, were concerned because pursuing the
matter in civilian tribunals might be viewed as an act of disobedience
toward the Commander in Chief and, thus, they wrote the President and
sought authority for the legal challenge on July 6. 59 Biddle counseled
Roosevelt against officially denying the request and, therefore, the
presidential secretary, Marvin Mcintyre, contacted the lawyers and
instructed the attorneys to exercise their best judgment. 60 Dowell and
Royall then responded that the defense would file habeas corpus
proceedings, which provoked an irate reaction from Roosevelt who
informed the Attorney General: "I won't hand them over to any United
States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus. " 61
On July 8, when the tribunal convened, Royall proclaimed that the
Order that established the comm1ss1on was "invalid and
unconstitutional" and began to develop a strategy for challenging it. 62 In
late July, Biddle and Royall persuaded Justice Hugo Black and Justice
Owen Roberts that the Supreme Court should entertain the case, while
the jurists convinced Chief Justice Stone to convene a special session of
the High Court that would receive the saboteurs' petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. 63 On July 28, the defense lawyers filed applications for
habeas corpus writs in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, which the district court promptly rejected. 64 The following
day, the attorneys filed habeas corpus petitions in the Supreme Court. 65
During oral argument before the Justices, the lawyers appealed the
district court's determination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and when that request was denied filed
58.
See RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 181-82; Belknap, supra note 35, at 67;
Danelski, supra note 35, at 68.
59.
See Letter from Cassius Dowell & Kenneth Royall to President Roosevelt
(July 6, 1942) (President's Secretary's Files: Departmental File: Justice Department,
1940-1944) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park,
N.Y.). See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 56-59, 64-65; Belknap, supra note 35,
at 68 (citing Letter from Dowell & Royall to President Roosevelt, supra).
60.
See FISHER, supra note 35, at 65-66; Belknap, supra note 35, at 68;
Danelski, supra note 35, at 68.
See FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962); see also Danelski,
61.
supra note 35, at 68.
62.
See Belknap, supra note 35, at 68 (citing Transcript of Trial Proceedings,
Map Room Papers, Boxes 198-201, at 4 (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, N.Y.)). See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 56-57.
See FISHER, supra note 35, at 67-68; RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 210-12,
63.
243-46; Danelski, supra note 35, at 68.
See Ex pane Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1942); see also Quirin, 317
64.
U.S. at 19.
65.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19; Danelski, supra note 35, at 68; see also
FISHER, supra note 35, at 68.
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certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court, which the Justices granted on
the day that they affirmed the district court action and dismissed the
petitions for habeas corpus writs. 66
Attorneys for the government and for the petitioners labored under
enormous temporal restraints; however, they managed to file briefs
which comprised more than 180 pages on July 29, the initial day of
Supreme Court oral argument. 67 The Court heard those arguments over
five and one-half hours on July 29 and for three and one-half hours the
following day .68 Prior to commencement of the initial oral arguments,
Chief Justice Stone and all the other Court members except William 0.
Douglas, who was traveling from Oregon, met in conference for a
preliminary discussion of the case. 69 Justice Roberts, whom Stone had
asked to preside, informed his colleagues that the Attorney General
believed Roosevelt would execute the saboteurs regardless of how the
Court decided their appeals. 70 Justice Frankfurter also questioned the
propriety of having Justice Frank Murphy hear the matter, because the
jurist was serving as a reserve army lieutenant colonel on active duty at
the time, while Justice Murphy, who wished to participate, reluctantly
concluded that he must withdraw, "lest a breath of criticism be leveled
at the Court. " 71
The Justices promptly resolved the case. Less than twenty-four
hours after the lawyers had finished their oral arguments, the Supreme
Court convened to issue a cursory per curiam order. Chief Justice Stone
reviewed the litigation's history, stated the Court would announce the
Justices' determination, and explained that the Supreme Court would
subsequently file a full-dress opinion that explicated its reasoning. 72 The
brief per curiam order found that Roosevelt possessed sufficient
constitutional authority to try the petitioners before a military
66.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19-20; Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. For a
descriptive account of the procedural machinations whereby the "Court's jurisdiction
caught up with the Court just at the finish line," see Boris I. Bittker, The World War II
German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of Certiorari Before Judgment by the Court of
Appeals: A Tale ofNunc Pro Tune Jurisdiction, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 431 (1997).
See Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. See generally FISHER, supra note 35,
67.
at 87-88.
68.
Belknap, supra note 35, at 75. For summaries of the arguments proffered
by the United States and by the petitioners, see id. at 70-75; Danelski, supra note 35, at
68-69. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 89-108.
69.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 69.
70.
See id. Stone remarked, "[tlhat would be a dreadful thing." Id.
71.
See Belknap, supra note 35, at 78 (citing Note to Ed (Kemp) (Sept. 10,
1942) (Frank Murphy MSS, Michigan Historical Collections, Univ. of Mich.)); see also
SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 256, 404 (1984); ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 654-55 (1956).
72.
Belknap, supra note 35, at 76-77; Danelski, supra note 35, at 71.
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comm1ss1on, the chief executive had lawfully established the tribunal,
and the saboteurs had "not shown cause for being discharged by writ of
habeas corpus. " 73
The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the
petitioners' applications for habeas corpus writs and affirmed the district
court. 74
The proceeding conducted by the military commission, which had
been discontinued while the appeals were being pursued in the Supreme
Court, expeditiously resumed. 75 On August 1, the attorneys presented
closing arguments, and two days later, the commission found all of the
defendants guilty of the charges against them and recommended death
sentences. The tribunal submitted the 3,000-page record, which it had
compiled directly to the President for his consideration and action. On
August 8, the White House announced that Roosevelt had accepted
virtually all of the commission's suggestions, although the Chief
Executive commuted sentences, which the tribunal proposed for the two
saboteurs who had defected. 76 The identical day, the government
electrocuted the remaining six petitioners. 77 The President then sealed
the record in the case throughout the duration of World War II. 78
Chief Justice Stone consumed more than six weeks agonizing over
the draft of the full opinion for the Court. 79 The jurist posited a
basically intuitive rationale to support the decision, yet his law clerks
found "little authority" for this justification while Stone could only cite
analogous cases at numerous crucial points in the draft and even
formulated alternative versions of its last segment. 80 On September 16,
after the Chief Justice had finished crafting the opinion, he wrote
Frankfurter: "About all I can say for what I have done is that I think
[the draft opinion] will present the Court all tenable and pseudo-tenable

73.
74.

See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19; see also RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 272.
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19; see also supra note 64 and accompanying

text.
75.
We rely in this paragraph on RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 281, and
Danelski, supra note 35, at 71.
76.
Belknap, supra note 35, at 77; Danelski, supra note 35, at 72.
77.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 72. Roosevelt reportedly hoped that the
military commission would recommend death by hanging. See WILLIAM D. HASSETT,
OFF THE RECORD WITH FDR, 1942-1945, at 90, 97 (1958).
78.
See Bernstein, supra note 36, at 188-89; see also Danelski, supra note 35,
at 72.
79.
We rely in this paragraph on Danelski, supra note 35, at 72-75.
80.
See Danelski, supra note 35, at 72 (citing Letter from Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone to Bennett Hoskey (Aug. 9, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone
See generally infra notes 129-32, 135, and
Papers, Library of Congress)).
accompanying text.
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bases for decision. " 81 Justice Frankfurter stated the iteration satisfied
him completely, and he had "nothing to contribute except
appreciation. " 82 On September 25, Stone circulated the proposed
opinion and a memorandum, suggesting that some questions which
defense counsel aired in July had not been before the Justices but
asserting the issues should be resolved against the saboteurs, lest the
Court be "in the unenviable position of having stood by and allowed six
men to go to their death without making it plain to all concernedincluding the President-that it had left undecided a question on which
counsel strongly relied to secure petitioners' liberty. " 83
Several Justices, however, were less sanguine than Frankfurter.
Illustrative was the concern expressed by Justice Roberts that the
decision might be construed in a manner which would legitimate the
Roosevelt administration's effort to nullify federal court jurisdiction and
his recommendation that the Justices explicitly find the President lacked
this authority. 84 Frankfurter responded with a strong plea for judicial
restraint, while he said the Proclamation should not "be read as
foreclosing inquiry into what it means as applied to this case and . . . we
should rest there and not open up what verily is a Pandora's box. " 85
Roberts and the remaining brethren found the proposed resolution
acceptable, and Stone incorporated this suggestion in the draft opinion. 86
Justice Black correspondingly voiced the idea that the draft could be
interpreted as an overbroad endorsement of military tribunals' use and,
thus, "might go far to destroy the protections declared by the [Ex parte]
Milligan case. " 87 Stone, therefore, implemented changes in the opinion

81.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 75 (alteration in original) (citing Letter from
Chief Justice Stone to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 16, 1942) (on file with the Harlan
Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress)).
82.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 75 (citing Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter
to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (n.d.) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Library of Congress)). "[You face and resolve] issues of high moment ... in a manner
worthy of them." Id.
83.
Belknap, supra note 35, at 78 (citing Memorandum from Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, for the Court (Sept. 25, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Library of Congress)).
84.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 75 (citing Suggestions Made By Justice Owen
Roberts to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (n.d.) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers,
Harvard Law School)).
85.
Id. at 75-76 (citing Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone (Oct. 15, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of
Congress)).
86.
Id. at 76.
87.
Id. at 76 (citing Justice Hugo Black to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
(Oct. 2, 1942) (on file with the Hugo L. Black Papers, Library of Congress)); see also
infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.

Quirin Revisited

2003:309

325

that satisfied Black's concerns. 88
Justice Douglas proffered one
important proposal requesting the omission of a sentence in the draft that
provided: "Even the guilty are entitled to be tried by a tribunal and by
laws which the Constitution has prescribed as a means of determining
their guilt. "89 The jurist thought that the sentence could be construed as
finding it "unlawful for the executive to have disposed of the petitioners
summarily without a trial by a tribunal. " 90 Douglas argued that the
question was not before the Court and the issue should be left
unaddressed, while Stone agreed and deleted the objectionable
sentence. 91
Once the Chief Justice had negotiated the modifications above,
Stone focused on the application of two provisions in the Articles of
War over which the Court's members were evenly split and for which
he had drafted alternative versions. 92 Justice Frankfurter favored
Memorandum B, stating that the Articles of War did not bind the Chief
Executive, and the jurist attempted to persuade several of his colleagues
throughout the summer. 93 However, Frankfurter did not convince
Justice Stanley Reed, and Frankfurter lost a supporter when Justice
James Byrnes resigned from the Supreme Court on October 2. 94 The
ensuing half-month witnessed little movement related to the question.
Nonetheless, on October 16, Justice Robert H. Jackson circulated a
memorandum that resembled a concurrence, a development that
particularly disturbed Stone, Frankfurter and Black, who had earlier
agreed that securing unanimity was imperative. 95 Jackson believed the
Court exceeded its powers "in reviewing the legality of the President's
order[, while] experience shows the judicial system is ill-adapted to deal
with matters in which we must present a united front to a foreign foe. "96
88.
See Danelski, supra note 35, at 76.
Id. at 76 (citing Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice
89.
Harlan Fiske Stone (Oct. 17, 1942) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Papers,
Library of Congress)).

90.

See id.

91.
See id. (citing Memorandum from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, for the
Conference (Oct. 17, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of
Congress)); see also Belknap, supra note 35, at 78.
92.
See Danelski supra note 35, at 76; supra note 80; infra notes 129-32 and
accompanying text.
93.
Danelski, supra note 35, at 76 (citing Memorandum by Justice Felix
Frankfurter to Justices Owen Roberts, Stanley Reed, & James Byrnes (Aug. 1942) (on
file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School)).
94.
Id. (citing Letter from Justice Stanley Reed to Justice Felix Frankfurter
(undated, received Sept. 13, 1942) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law
. School)).
95.
See id. (citing Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23,
1942) (on file with the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress)).
96.
Id.; see also Belknap, supra note 35, at 79.
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The release of Jackson's memorandum seemingly doomed
aspirations to reach a unanimous determination; however, Frankfurter
responded by circulating a document titled F.F. 's Soliloquy. 91 This
imaginary dialogue with the saboteurs castigated them for having the
temerity to pursue habeas corpus writs and for sowing the "seeds of a
bitter conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress. " 98 The
document concomitantly admonished the brethren through an
impassioned patriotic appeal against igniting an ethereal constitutional
debate when the nation was at total war. 99
Shortly after Justice Jackson had read the Soliloquy, he decided not
to publish a concurring opinion. 100 Justice Roberts similarly responded
that he would support some type of compromise: "a sort of Northern
Pacific formulation in as brief a form as possible as Black suggests." 101
The Chief Justice continued with "patient negotiations" 102 and
subsequently brokered an amicable resolution in which his colleagues
"agreed to disagree without adopting either Memorandum A or B,"
while Stone announced the Court's decision on October 29, 1942. 103
In sum, review of the factual background which underlies Ex parte
Quirin reveals those facts were sui generis. Perhaps most important, the
factual scenario reflected the exceptional circumstances that pertained
near the time at which the United States entered World War II and the
fears that the Nazi saboteurs provoked in U.S. society. The next
Section descriptively and critically analyzes the Supreme Court opinion
in Ex parte Quirin.

B.

The Opinion in Quirin

1.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court purposefully resolved the appeal on the
narrowest conceivable grounds, so remarking in specific terms, as well

97.
Felix Frankfurter, F.F. 's Soliloquy (Oct. 23, 1942), reprinted in 5 GREEN
BAG 2D 438 (2002).
98.
See id. at 439; see also Danelski, supra note 35, at 77.
99.
See Frankfurter, supra note 97; see also infra notes 139-40 and
accompanying text.
100. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 78 (citing Notes Exchanged By Justices
Felix Frankfurter & Robert Jackson (Oct. 1942) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers,
Harvard Law School)).
101. Id. (citing Letter from Justice Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter
(n.d.) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School)).
102. Id. (citing Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Roger Nelson
(Nov. 30, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress)).
103. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 78-79. See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.
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as explicitly declined to address numerous particular factual and legal
matters. For example, the Justices neither performed a thoroughgoing
review of the substantive claims against, and defenses asserted by, the
saboteurs nor of the procedures employed to test them. This scrutiny
derived in large measure from the litigants' agreement that searching
review exceeded the capacity of the Supreme Court, given the
circumstances, such as temporal restraints, under which the matter was
argued and decided. Indeed, most of Quirin's facts were stipulated and
undisputed, 104 while Chief Justice Stone observed "[w]e are not here
concerned with any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners. " 105
The Supreme Court correspondingly declined to resolve specific legal
issues. For instance, the Justices left undecided whether presidential
authority itself sufficed to establish military tribunals or whether
lawmakers "may restrict the power of the Commander in Chief to deal
with enemy belligerents," principally because Congress had "authorized
trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions. " 106
The Court also stated that it had "no occasion now to define with
meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military
tribunals to try persons according to the law of war" 107 and held only
that the defendants' "particular acts constitute an offense against the law
of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military
commission." 108
The Justices first considered the government's argument that the
Proclamation issued by the Roosevelt administration specifically barred
petitioners from seeking relief in the federal courts because the
individuals held the status of "enemy aliens" and had participated in the
activities we recounted earlier. 109 Despite the Proclamation's express
terms, which ostensibly foreclosed judicial scrutiny, the Justices
entertained the saboteurs' habeas corpus applications, stating "there is

104.

See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20. We reproduce many Quirin facts supra Part

II.A.
105. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. For example, the Supreme Court did not resolve
the question of whether one saboteur had actually lost his U.S. citizenship. See id. at
37-38; infra note 119 and accompanying text.
106. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47, 29; see also infra notes 115-20 and
accompanying text.
107. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46; see also infra note 127 and accompanying text.
108. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
109. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25. "Enemy aliens" is the term that the Supreme
Court actually employed. See id. at 25; see also supra notes 36-45 and accompanying
text.

328

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for
determining its applicability tO the particular Case. " 110
The Supreme Court admonished that the federal judiciary should
not invalidate petitioners' trial and detention-which the president had
ordered through exercise of Commander in Chief authority during
wartime-absent the clear conviction that they violate the Constitution or
statutes. 111 The High Court surveyed the power that Articles I and II of
the Constitution delegate to provide for the common defense. 112 The
Justices concluded the President possesses broad authority for waging
war that Congress has declared and for effectuating all legislation that
prescribes war's conduct as well as defines and punishes "offenses
against the law of nations. " 113 When the Court canvassed the Articles of
War, it ascertained Congress had explicitly provided that military
commissions "shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against
the law of war in appropriate cases. " 114
The Justices then inquired "whether any of the acts charged is an
offense against the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal, and
if so whether the Constitution prohibits the trial. " 115 The Supreme Court
determined, "[b]y universal agreement and practice, the law of war
draws a distinction between . . . lawful and unlawful combatants": The
former are "subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by
opposing military forces. " 116 Unlawful combatants, such as the enemy
"who without uniform comes secretly through the lines" to wage war
through destruction of life or property, are "offenders against the law of
war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. " 117 The
Justices classified the saboteurs in the latter category, ascertaining the
first charge's initial specification sufficed to "charge all the petitioners
with the offense of unlawful belligerency, trial of which" was within the
commission's jurisdiction. 118 The Court observed that the saboteurs
were not "any the less belligerents" because some were U.S. citizens or
because they had not "actually committed or attempted to commit any

llO. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25; see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating
that Congress "has not withdrawn [jurisdiction}, and the Executive branch" could not
unless the habeas corpus writ were suspended).
lll. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
112. See id. at 25-29; see also U.S. CONST. arts. 1-11.
ll3. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
114. Id. at 28. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3-7' at 670 (3d ed. 2000).
ll5. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
ll6. Id. at 30-31.
ll7. Id. at 31.
I 18. See id. at 36.
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act of depredation" or entered an area of active military operations. 119
"The offense was complete when" each individual, who was an enemy
belligerent, passed or went behind U.S. "military and naval lines and
defenses ... in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. " 120
The Court next considered the merits of petitioners' substantive
arguments that the Fifth Amendment entitled them to "presentment or
indictment of a grand jury" and that Article III, Section II and the Sixth
Amendment entitled them to trial by jury in a civil court. 121 The Justices
said "long-continued and consistent interpretation" meant the
constitutional provisos could not "be taken to have extended the right to
demand a jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that
offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be
tried only in the civil courts. " 122 The Court did assume that certain
offenses against the law of war are "constitutionally triable only by a
jury, " 123 a holding which it had propounded in Ex parte Milligan. 124
Petitioners emphasized this case for the proposition that the law of
war "can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed. " 125 However, the Justices attempted to distinguish
the important opinion because Milligan "was not an enemy belligerent,"
while they apparently limited the earlier decision to its specific facts and
treated the determination as inapplicable to the present case. 126
Finally, the Court considered it unnecessary to delineate "with
meticulous care the ultimate boundaries" of military tribunals'
jurisdiction, because petitioners, "upon the conceded facts, were plainly
within those boundaries. " 127 The Justices, therefore, held only that the
particular acts committed were an "offense against the law of war which
the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission." 128
The Court was "unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in
question could not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for
119. Id. at 38; see also TRIBE, supra note 114, § 3-5, at 300 n.185.
120. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
121. Id. at 38-45; see also U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; Id. amends. V-VI.
122. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40. See generally TRIBE, supra note 114, § 3-5, at
299-300.
123. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
124. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 128-37;
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1286 n.102.
125. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121).
126. See id. at 45-46. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, IR., DANIEL I.
MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 47-50 (4th ed. 1996, 2002 Supp.) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER];
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1277-87.
127. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 46.
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issuing the writ," 129 yet it lacked a majority who agreed on the
"appropriate grounds for decision. " 130 Some Justices believed that
"Congress did not intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential
military commission convened for the determination of questions
relating to admitted enemy invaders. " 131 Nonetheless, other Justices
thought that the Articles covered this tribunal but the specific ones did
"not foreclose the procedure prescribed by the President or that shown
to have been employed" by the Commission. 132

2.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A number of considerations warrant restricting the op1mon in

Quirin. For example, the decision evidences the alacrity with which the
government prosecuted the saboteurs and the Supreme Court ratified the
military commission deliberations as well as the complications of
rationalizing the Court's determination after the United States had
invoked a quickly drafted, terse per curiam order when it executed six
of the eight petitioners. 133 More specifically, Chief Justice Stone, who
penned the opinion, characterized the attempt to justify the result as a
"mortification of the flesh," 134 while the Supreme Court members could
not articulate the reasoning for their conclusion. 135 Quin'n also evinces
the wartime context when, for instance, national security concerns have
traditionally undermined, and perhaps eclipsed, civil liberties. 136 At a
crucial juncture in the complex, delicate negotiations over a final
decision, Justice Jackson even circulated a memorandum which
suggested that the Court had exceeded its authority by considering the
Roosevelt administration Order. 137
129. Id. at 47.
130. Id.; see also supra notes 80, 92-103, and accompanying text.
131. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47.
132. Id. at 47-48.
133. See id. at 18. See generally supra note l.
134. See MASON, supra note 71, at 659; Danelski, supra note 35, at 72; Turley,
supra note 47.
135. See supra notes 80, 92-103, 129-32, and accompanying text.
136. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); REHNQUIST, supra note 55;
TRIBE, supra note 114, § 4-6, at 670; Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 191-93 (1962).
137. "[Elxperience shows the judicial system is ill-adapted to deal with matters
in which we must present a united front to a foreign foe." Jackson Memorandum, supra
note 95. The war power "usually is invoked in haste . . . when calm legislative
consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic
fervor that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges
under the influence of the same passions and pressures." Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Duncan v.
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The opinion concomitantly reflects inappropriate pressures from
without, exerted most significantly by President Roosevelt, to validate
the saboteurs' swift trial, prompt conviction, and severe punishment138
as well as related machinations within the Court, especially implicating
Justice Frankfurter. The jurist's soliloquy included a hypothetical
dialogue with the dead saboteurs that excoriated them and admonished
his colleagues against precipitating a constitutional crisis when the nation
was engaged in total war. 139 Even Frankfurter ultimately acknowledged
that Quirin was "not a happy precedent. " 140 Two decades after the
ruling's issuance, Justice William 0. Douglas lamented: "Our
experience with [Quirin] indicated . . . to all of us that is extremely
undesirable to announce a decision on the merits without an opinion
accompanying it. Because once the search for the grounds ... is made,
sometimes those grounds crumble. " 141 Moreover, as Chief Justice Stone
argued, the case was extraordinary and should be limited to its peculiar
facts. 142 Numerous commentators have urged that the decision be read
narrowly, and prominent observers, namely Professors Neal K. Katyal,
Laurence H. Tribe, and Jonathan Turley, have even repudiated it,
analogizing Quirin to Korematsu, the discredited case that permitted
internment of Japanese Americans. 143
In sum, certain aspects of Quirin are so salient to the issues that we
consider in our article that they warrant emphasis and reiteration. First,
the Supreme Court did exercise jurisdiction. This is critical because
Roosevelt's Proclamation, which served as the model for the Bush
Order, purportedly deprived federal courts of jurisdiction. Second, the
Justices addressed, and resolved on the merits, the petitioners'
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 357 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting). See generally TRIBE,
supra note 114, § 4-6, at 670.
138. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 35, at 50-53; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 8,
at 1291; supra notes 46-55.
139. See Frankfurter, supra note 97, at 439-40; G. Edward White, Felix
Frankfuner's "Soliloquyn in Ex pane Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423 (2002). See
generally EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947).
140. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 80 (quoting Memorandum of Justice Felix
Frankfurter (June 4, 1953) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School));
White, supra note 139, at 436.
141. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 80 (quoting Transcription of interviews of
William 0. Douglas, by Walter F. Murphy, pp. 204-05, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library, Princeton Univ.); see also Turley, supra note 47.
142. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46; see also supra notes 105-09, 128-29, and
accompanying text. For similar articulations of the precept that the Court should
narrowly draft opinions, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952), and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981).
143. See Katya! & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1290-91; Turley, supra note 47; see
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Warren, supra note 136, at 193
n.33.
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substantive claims under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. Third, the
High Court's role in any habeas corpus proceeding was extremely
circumscribed at that time and only permitted inquiry regarding the
commission's jurisdiction. The next Part of this Article,. therefore,
evaluates more specifically the precise nature of federal habeas corpus
when the Supreme Court issued Quirin.

III. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS THEN AND Now
As we demonstrated above, careful scrutiny of the Quirin opinion
and its historical context limits the present significance of the Bush
administration's repeated observation that there the Court inquired into
only the lawfulness of the special military commission's jurisdiction
over the eight Nazi saboteurs. 144 The Court did frame the issue in terms
of tribunal jurisdiction over the petitioners and the offenses they
allegedly committed; however, it resolved on the merits petitioners'
Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims as well as their assertions that the
commission procedures violated the Articles of War. Moreover, the
parties' extensive stipulation to the underlying facts obviated any need
for judicial review of those facts or how they were to be proved. 145 Yet,
assuming arguendo that the Quirin Court had limited its inquiry to the
commission's jurisdiction, in that term's narrowest sense, 146 Quirin
would not now support similar circumscription of federal judicial review
of any detention or punishment imposed pursuant to the Bush Order.
Even if the Quirin decision mandated such narrow review, that aspect of
the ruling must be updated to reflect the dramatic evolution of federal
habeas corpus law over the ensuing sixty years. This Part first recovers
the law that governed the scope of federal habeas corpus review circa
1942, the year that Quirin was decided, and then sketches its substantial
expansion over the six decades intervening between the Quirin case and
the Bush Order.

144. See supra notes 104-43 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (observing that the precedential
significance of Quirin was limited by the parties' factual stipulation).
146. In any event, we acknowledge that the Quirin Court did not undertake an
extensive review of the substantive allegations against and defenses of the petitioners or
of the procedures employed to test those allegations and defenses, in large part pursuant
to the parties' agreement that such searching review was beyond the Court's capacity
given the context in which the case was argued and decided. See supra notes 105-09
and accompanying text.
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Federal Habeas Corpus Circa 1942

To recover the state of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in 1942,
we review the writ's prior development with considerable specificity.
This detail is necessitated by the complex and often inconsistent
historiography of federal habeas corpus. 147 Our evaluation ascertains
that both the case law and the best scholarly assessment of this
jurisprudence suggest federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was extremely
narrow when the Court decided Quirin.
1.

HABEAS CORPUS TO 1879

Centuries before the founding of the United States of America,
English common law courts used the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, often denominated the "Great Writ," to review legal
challenges to an individual's imprisonment. 148 At both common law,
and under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, however, the writ was
147. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 1364-68 (discussing
the historical debate about the proper scope of the writ in federal court). Leading, and
sometimes conflicting, commentaries on habeas corpus history include WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); ERIC M. FREEDMAN,
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Marc M. Arkin, The
Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70
TUL. L. REV. l (1995); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 16 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Clarke D. Forsythe, The
Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 10 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1079 (1995); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack
on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Lewis
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U.
CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966); Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 153; Gary Peller, Jn Defense of
Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982); Herbert
Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great
Writ, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 167 (1988); and Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45
STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993). Throughout the ensuing discussion, we treat the landmark
cases in the text and address the relevant scholarly commentary in the accompanying
footnotes.
148. A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of "New Rules" and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. l, 4 (2002); see
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 53, at 350 (5th ed. 1994); Michael
O'Neill, On Reforming the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus, 26 SETON HALL L. REV.
1493, 1497-98 (1996) (discussing historical development of the writ of habeas corpus).
See generally William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978). The writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum was but one of several forms of the writ of habeas corpus available at
common law. For a discussion of other forms of the writ, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 126, at 1337 n. l.
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unavailable to a petitioner incarcerated under a final judgment of a court
exercising competent jurisdiction. 149 Thus, a prisoner adjudicated guilty
of a crime and sentenced accordingly could obtain relief through a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus only by attacking the jurisdiction of
the court which rendered the judgment against him.
Merely
demonstrating that this court committed even a serious legal error when
it reached the judgment would not suffice. 150
The "Great Writ" was recognized early on in colonial America.
Before ratification of the U.S. Constitution, courts in the American
colonies employed the writ and many adopted the core protections of the
1679 Act. 151 The Constitution acknowledged and protected this practice
by providing that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it. " 152 In 1789, the First Federal Congress
authorized the federal courts to grant "writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment" when properly
petitioned by those "in custody, under or by colour of the authority of
the United States. " 153
ln due time, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the scope of habeas
corpus review. In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of
resolving one of the first major habeas corpus cases to reach the
Supreme Court, observed that "for the meaning of the term habeas

149. DUKER, supra note 147, at 225.
150. See id.
151. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.2, at 843-44 (3d
ed. 1999); DUKER, supra note 147, at 115; Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection
of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 337-41 (1983).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For opposing views on the meaning of the
Suspension Clause, compare DUKER, supra note 147, at 126-56 (arguing that the
Framers intended the Clause to limit Congress's ability to interfere with the availability
of the writ in state courts, but did not seek to limit Congress's power to disallow the writ
in federal court), with Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification
Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451 (1996) (arguing for a broader interpretation of the
Clause that would limit Congress's power to narrow federal habeas corpus), and Jordan
Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing that
"the Suspension Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment together are best read to
mandate federal habeas corpus review of the convictions of state prisoners"); see also
Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 555 (2002). Our analysis, which focuses on the dramatic
evolution during the last sixty years in judicial interpretation of the federal habeas corpus
statutes, takes no position in the ongoing debate concerning the proper scope of the
Constitution's Suspension Clause.
153. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789); see also WRIGHT,
supra note 148, § 53, at 350-51.
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corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law. " 1s 4
Finally, in the 1830 case of Ex parte Watkins 1ss the Chief Justice
clarified that, in the U.S. courts as in English ones, the writ would be
unavailable for one confined pursuant to the final judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Tobias Watkins, who had been the fourth
auditor of the U.S. Treasury, was indicted and convicted in the U.S.
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia on charges that he had
defrauded the Navy Department of approximately three thousand
The circuit court sentenced Watkins to nine months
dollars. 1s6
imprisonment and imposed fines on him which were comparable to the
amounts allegedly misappropriated. 1s7 When Watkins was in custody
under the sentence of imprisonment, he petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment had failed
to charge a criminal offense cognizable in the federal circuit court. lss
Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote for a unanimous Court, refused
the writ. 1s9 Marshall first reaffirmed that English legal history properly
informed the Court's efforts to delineate the scope of federal judicial
power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. 160 He then applied this lesson
by initially noticing that English law denied the writ to persons who
were imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction imposed by a court of
competent jurisdiction and then concluding that the same limitation
governed the power of a federal court to grant the writ. 161 After the
Chief Justice recognized that the authority to grant the writ included the
power to "inquire into the sufficiency of [the] cause" of a prisoner's
commitment, he asked rhetorically "but if [that cause] be the judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction . . . is not that judgment in itself
sufficient cause? Can the court, upon this writ, look beyond the

154. Ex pane Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
155. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
156. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 195-96.
157. Ex Pane Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 571 (1833).
158. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 370.
159. Id. at 376.
160. Id. at 370-71; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371; see Bator, supra note 147, at 466. But see
Liebman, supra note 147, at 2060 (denying that Watkins limited habeas corpus review to
jurisdictional claims); Peller, supra note 147, at 611-12 (same conclusion). For a
detailed response to Professors Liebman and Peller on this point, see Forsythe, supra
note 147, at 1147-61. However one resolves this debate concerning the best reading of
Watkins between Bator and Forsythe, on the one hand, and Liebman and Peller, on the
other, we think it clear that in 1942 the Justices embraced the orthodox understanding of
the ruling set forth in the text and reflected in the Bator and Forsythe articles, rather
than the revisionist view of the case articulated long after Quirin had been decided. See
infra notes 209-36 and accompanying text.
0
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judgment, and reexamine the charges on which it was rendered. " 162
Lest there be any doubt as to how Marshall would answer these
questions, he added:
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment
of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as
conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would
be. It is as conclusive on this court as on other courts. It puts
an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it. 163
The Chief Justice's application of the "jurisdiction" test to the
claims raised by petitioner Watkins reflected his understanding of this
test as severely circumscribing the habeas corpus court's role. Indeed,
Watkins's counsel had conceded that "the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive" against a petition for the writ but
maintained that the writ should issue because the indictment of his client
exceeded the circuit court's jurisdiction. 164 Counsel for Watkins
162. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371. At various points is his opinion for the Court,
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the federal jurisdictional statutes had not granted
the Supreme Court authority to review federal criminal convictions, such as the one
resulting in Watkins's imprisonment, by way of a writ of error. See, e.g., id. (noting
that the judgment of the federal circuit court convicting and sentencing Watkins was
"withdrawn by law from the revision of this court"); id. at 372 ("We have no power to
examine the proceedings [in the federal circuit court] on a writ of error, and it would be
strange, if, under color of a writ to liberate an individual from unlawful imprisonment,
we could substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond our
control."). These passages identify an additional factor which the Court apparently
considered in construing the writ-a factor that other commentators have emphasized
and then employed to draw conflicting inferences about the proper understanding of
federal habeas corpus history. Compare Peller, supra note 147, at 611-12 (arguing that
the Watkins Court's denial of the writ should be understood as the Court's attempt to
honor the congressional decision not to authorize Supreme Court appellate review in
federal criminal cases, rather than as reflecting a narrow view of the proper role of
habeas corpus generally), with Liebman, supra note 147, at 2096 (arguing that during
this same period the Supreme Court effectively circumvented Congress's denial of
Supreme Court appellate review in federal criminal cases by employing the writ of
habeas corpus liberally to "fillO the breach"). For Professor Liebman' s explanation of
Watkins, see supra note 161. We fmd these dueling deconstructions of dusty habeas
corpus precedents intriguing and insightful, in that they undoubtedly uncover an
important, though perhaps indeterminate, reason federal habeas corpus developed as it
did. We do not, however, think that these critiques diminish the significance of the
primary reason Chief Justice Marshall himself identified for limiting federal habeas
corpus proceedings to questions involving the committing court's jurisdiction-namely,
that the writ was so limited under the law of England from whence it had emerged.
Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371.
163. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371-72.
164. Id. at 371.
0
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specifically insisted that the indictment had failed even to charge an
offense "punishable criminally, according to the law of the land." 165
Marshall rejected this argument, however, concluding that the Court
could not, "under color of a writ to liberate an individual from unlawful
imprisonment," inquire into the legal soundness of indictment. 166
Marshall reasoned that imprisonment under a judgment, even an
"erroneous" one, was lawful, "unless that judgment be an absolute
nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the
subject. " 167 As the circuit court had "general jurisdiction over criminal
cases," the circuit court must determine "whether the offence charged in
the indictment be legally punishable or not. " 168 Because the circuit court
"was competent to decide" this issue, its judgment, even if in error as to
this fundamental point, was nevertheless conclusive. 169
Marshall
summarized the Court's rationale in sweeping terms:
The judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself
evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support no
inspection of the indictments on which it is founded. . . . The
judgment informs us that the commitment is legal, and with
that information it is our duty to be satisfied. 170
After briefly distinguishing the cases on which counsel for Watkins had
chiefly relied, Marshall announced that the Justices were "unanimously
of the opinion . . . that the writ of habeas corpus ought not to be
awarded" to Watkins. 171
To be sure, judges sometimes honored in the breach 172 as well as
the observance 173 the rule of Watkins-that the scope of a federal habeas
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 374.
170. Id. at 375.
171. Id. at 377. Watkins returned to the U.S. Supreme Court three years later,
raising a new challenge to his continuing confinement. Although by then he had
completed his sentence of imprisonment, he remained in custody for failure to satisfy the
monetary fines assessed against him. Watkins, 32 U.S. at 569. Justice Story writing for
the majority of the Court concluded that Watkins could not be detained for non-payment,
absent an additional court order committing him to custody on this ground. Id. at 57879.
172. See DUKER, supra note 147, at 229-30 (discussing mid-nineteenth-century
Supreme Court cases, including the second Watkins decision, 32 U.S. 568, in which the
Court failed to invoke the jurisdiction standard).
173. See id. at 275 (citing mid-nineteenth-century cases and commentary in
accord with the Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, jurisdictional limit on federal habeas
corpus review).
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corpus court's inquiry was limited to ascertaining whether a judgment
that authorized confinement had been issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction. But, the occasional neglect of the jurisdiction rule neither
diminished the clarity of the Watkins pronouncement on this fundamental
principle nor detracted from the fact that "[b]y the mid-nineteenth
century, the principle was well established." 174
This was the state of habeas corpus jurisprudence when, in 1867,
the Reconstruction Congress greatly expanded the class of persons
entitled to seek the writ from a federal court. Whereas the 1789 Act
authorized federal court issuance of the writ only to federal prisoners, 175
the 1867 statute vested the federal courts with power to grant the writ
"in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States. " 176 Although the sweeping breadth of the quoted language
produced some confusion immediately after its enactment, 177 the
Supreme Court soon concluded that the 1867 Act did not disturb the
jurisdiction rule of Watkins or otherwise expand the scope of issues
cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 178 In other words, the
1867 Act clearly extended the federal writ's availability to state as well
as federal prisoners. The Supreme Court authoritatively concluded,
however, that when the habeas corpus petitioner was held in custody
pursuant to a (state or federal) court judgment, the 1867 Act did not
broaden the federal habeas corpus court's inquiry beyond reviewing the
committing court's jurisdiction. 179
2.

1879 TO 1937

During the last decades of the nineteenth century and through the
first half of the twentieth century, the Court gradually expanded the
concept of jurisdiction for the purposes of the Watkins rule. Over these
many decades, the Court characterized as challenges to the committing

174. DUKER, supra note 147, at 229 (citing cases and commentary to this
effect).
175. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
176. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
177. See DUKER, supra note 147, at 230-34 (discussing the impact of the 1867
Act on the Supreme Court's rhetoric regarding the purposes and availability of the writ).
178. See generally id. at 239-48.
179. See id. at 243, 247-48. The 1867 Act did, however, significantly liberalize
the procedures employed in federal habeas corpus cases, perhaps most significantly by
directing the federal habeas corpus court "to determine the facts of the case, by hearing
the testimony and arguments." Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 1867 Act); see also Alexander Holtzoff,
Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U. L. REV. 26, 31-33 (1945).
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court's jurisdiction an increasing number and variety of constitutional
claims, rendering them cognizable in federal habeas corpus. 180 These
cases undeniably reflect an evolution in the scope of the inquiry
permissible in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, but they also
evidence the Court's unflagging commitment throughout this period to
the jurisdictional limitation announced in Watkins. 181
The particular cases are myriad/ 82 but review here of a select few
can illustrate the significance of all. The 1879 ruling in Ex parte
Siebold, 183 for example, established the proposition that a court lacked
jurisdiction to proceed against an individual for an alleged violation of
an unconstitutional statute and, therefore, that a conviction under such a
statute was void for want of jurisdiction in the trial court. 184 Although
Siebold basically expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus, the
decision also powerfully reaffirmed the Watkins rule of jurisdiction.
Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley observed that federal courts'
habeas corpus jurisdiction was restricted by "the nature and objects of
the writ itself, as defined by the common law, from which its name and
incidents are derived. " 185 Chief among the limitations on the writ was
that "[i]t cannot be used as a mere writ of error. " 186
Mere error in the judgment or proceedings, under and by
virtue of which a party is imprisoned, constitutes no ground
for the issue of the writ. Hence, upon a return to a habeas
corpus, that the prisoner is detained under a conviction and
sentence by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, the
general rule is, that he will be instantly remanded. No inquiry
will be instituted into the regularity of the proceedings . . . a
conviction and sentence by a court of competent jurisdiction is
lawful cause of imprisonment, and no relief can be given by

habeas corpus. 181

180. See generally Holtzoff, supra note 179.
181. See id. at 40-41.
182. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 147, at 241-48 (discussing cases).
183. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
184. Id. at 376-77.
185. Id. at 375.
186. Id.
187. Id. (second and third emphases added). Justice Bradley acknowledged that
the situation might be different if the court petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus was
authorized to review the judgment of conviction on a "writ of error or appeal," in which
case the appellate court might "perhaps, in its discretion, give immediate relief on
habeas corpus, and thus save the party the delay and expense of a writ of error." Id.
This concession in no way detracts from the force of Justice Bradley's reaffirmation of
the Watkins jurisdictional rule, but rather merely reflects that even in the nineteenth

340

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Indeed, Justice Bradley then strained to fit conviction under an
unconstitutional statute within the category of errors so fundamental that
they deprived a trial court of jurisdiction, rendering its judgment
assailable in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. He reasoned that a
trial court's reliance on an unconstitutional statute "affects the
foundation of the whole proceedings. " 188 This conclusion flowed from
the maxim that "[a]n unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. " 189
Thus, "[a]n offence created by it is not a crime," and "[a] conviction
under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a
legal cause of imprisonment. " 190 In the instant case, if the Court agreed
with petitioners' assertion that the federal statutes under which they
were indicted and convicted were unconstitutional, the federal circuit
court that had convicted and sentenced them "acquired no jurisdiction of
the causes," as "[i]ts authority to indict and try the petitioners arose
solely upon these laws. " 191
The Justices wrote the next important chapter in the history of
federal habeas corpus with two early twentieth-century cases which
implicated allegations that hostile mobs had dominated southern capital
trials. In the first, the 1915 case of Frank v. Mangum, the Court denied
the writ, over a powerful dissenting opinion authored by Justice Holmes,
for himself and Justice Hughes. 192 Eight years later in Moore v.
Dempsey, Justice Holmes, who then wrote for the majority of the Court,
distinguished Frank and granted the writ, with Justices McReynolds and
Sutherland dissenting. 193
Scholars have emphasized the apparent
inconsistency in these rulings. Some commentators have struggled to
reconcile them, 194 while others have concluded that Moore effectively
overruled Frank. 195
century, good judges were unwilling to let empty forms such as an error in pleading
triumph over substance.
188. Id. at 376.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 376-77.
191. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). Although the Court therefore addressed
petitioners' constitutional challenges to the federal criminal statutes under which they
were convicted, it ultimately upheld the federal statutes and accordingly denied the writ.
Id. at 377-99. Even the modest extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction affected by
Siebold was later repudiated. See Bator, supra note 147, at 474 n.77 (citing cases).
192. 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915).
193. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
194. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 147, at 50; Bator, supra note 147, at
488.
195. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 147, at 646-48. For a detailed and compelling
treatment of the disturbing facts underlying both Frank and Moore, see FREEDMAN,
supra note 147, at 52-85. Of course, our focus for present purposes on the doctrinal
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For our purposes, this intriguing question is immaterial, because all
the Justices reaffirmed the Watkins rule of jurisdiction while at the same
time gradually broadening the term's compass. In Frank, the Holmes
dissent and Justice Pitney's opinion for the Court both presumed that the
writ should issue if, and only if, the mob's influence had deprived the
Georgia court of lawful jurisdiction over the petitioner. 196 Indeed, both
opinions acknowledged that a hostile mob could so influence a criminal
trial as to rob the trial court of "jurisdiction" for the purposes of the
Watkins rule, thus entitling a petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief. 197
The disagreement among the Justices turned instead on the different
significance the majority and dissent attached to the Georgia Supreme
Court decision affirming Frank's conviction and sentence. Justice
Pitney, for the Court majority, reasoned that principles of federalism
compelled federal court deference to that ultimate ruling by the Georgia
Supreme Court, which was itself "free from any suggestion of mob
domination, or the like. " 198 Justice Holmes, however, refused to accord
the Georgia Supreme Court decision conclusive effect, reasoning that
once jurisdiction had been lost in the trial court, it "could not be
restored by any decision above. " 199
In Moore, both the majority opinion by Justice Holmes and the
dissent by Justice McReynolds similarly framed the question before the
Court as whether the "corrective process" afforded by the state appellate
courts sufficed to cleanse any taint upon the petitioners' conviction
amidst the highly charged circumstances of their trial. 200 Neither the
import of these two decisions should not be misunderstood as an insensitivity to the
inhumanity of the circumstances out of which each ruling arose.
196. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 326-27 (reciting the jurisdiction standard); id. at
347 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[t]he loss of jurisdiction [was} not general
but particular, and proceed[ed] from the control of a hostile influence").
197. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 332-34; id. at 347 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198. Frank, 237 U.S. at 333.
199. Id. at 348 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes continued:
And notwithstanding the principle of comity and convenience (for, in our
opinion, it is nothing more), that calls for a resort to the local appellate
tribunal before coming to the courts of the United States for a writ of habeas
corpus, when, as here, that resort has been had in vain, the power to secure
fundamental rights that had existed at every stage becomes a duty and must
be put forth.
Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted). It was this commitment to the duty of a federal court
to re-examine afresh allegations of fact that, if true, would rob a state criminal court of
jurisdiction that prompted Justice Holmes to write the following, oft-quoted, description
of the writ's proper role: "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very
tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the
proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell." Id. at 346.
200. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91; id. at 93-96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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majority nor the dissenting opinion in Moore questioned the continuing
authority of the well-established rule, recently reaffirmed by all in
Frank, that the writ did not extend to relieve a prisoner from a
conviction and sentence imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction. 201
Thus, although the Frank and Moore decisions reflected the Justices'
willingness to apply the Watkins jurisdiction test liberally and consider
underlying practicalities (i.e., recognizing that a mob-dominated trial is
actually no trial at all), these two landmark decisions simultaneously
evidenced the ongoing vitality of the Watkins rule.
3.

1938 TO 1947

In the 1938 case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 202 the Justices, having
already acknowledged the pragmatic realities confronted by a court
ruling in the midst of a violent mob, finally recognized the
insurmountable obstacles faced by an impoverished lay defendant
indicted in federal court. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
Johnson is most often, and justly, celebrated for establishing that the
Sixth Amendment requires a federal court to appoint counsel, at public
expense, for an impecunious criminal defendant, absent the defendant's
waiver of this entitlement. 203 Moreover, Black's opinion is frequently
cited for its strong statement counseling reluctance to find inadvertent
waiver of such fundamental constitutional rights. 204 That opinion is most
significant here, however, because in it Justice Black concluded that the
trial court's failure to appoint counsel deprived the tribunal of
jurisdiction for the purposes of federal habeas corpus. 205
In
substantiating the majority's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment,
Justice Black recognized "the obvious truth that the average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty. " 206
201. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (quoting Frank, 237 U.S. at 335). Justice
McReynolds did not accuse the majority of abandoning the rule of jurisdiction, nor did
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, question the rule. As in Frank, the division of
opinion in Moore concerned the adequacy of the appellate process afforded by the state
court and the significance to be accorded the state appellate courts' rejection of the very
same claims of mob-domination presented subsequently to the federal court in support of
the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Compare Frank, 237 U.S. at 335-36, with
Moore, 261 U.S. at 96-102 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
202. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
203. See, e.g .• DAVID P. CURRJE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 321 n.94 (1990).
204. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Johnson v. Zerbst, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1028 (Leonard w. Levy et al. eds. ' 1986).
205. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465-68.
206. Id. at 462-63.
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Justice Black remarked that this disability extended beyond the criminal
trial to the process for an appeal, leaving available for the effective
vindication of the right to appointed counsel only the habeas corpus
writ. 201
Given the subsequent expansion of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction, 208 these observations alone would easily warrant the writ's
issuance. But, Justice Black went further and demonstrated that relief
through habeas corpus was not only necessary to make the underlying
constitutional right meaningful, but also perfectly consistent with the
well-established rule that the writ would be granted for only those errors
which affected the jurisdiction of the committing court. 209 Justice Black
asserted that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel in criminal
cases constituted "an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal
court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty": 210
If the accused . . . is not represented by counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right,
the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid
conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.
A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost 'in
the course of the proceedings' due to failure to complete the
court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing
counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who
has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and
whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the
Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer
has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
207. Id. at 467.
Justice Black's recitation of the facts and procedural
background of the case included (I) the requirement of the federal rules of criminal
appeals that any appeal be commenced five days after the conclusion of proceedings in
the trial court; (2) the petitioner's transfer to a federal penitentiary in Atlanta two days
after the day on which he was arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced; and (3) that
upon his arrival at the Atlanta prison, he was, "as [was] the custom . . . placed in
isolation and so kept for sixteen days without being permitted to communicate with any
one except the officers of the institution." Id. at 461-62 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In light of these circumstances, it was not surprising that, when the
petitioner finally filed an application for an appeal months later, it was denied as
untimely. Id. Moreover, these circumstances lent added credence to the petitioner's
contentions that "after a conviction-he was unable to obtain a lawyer; was ignorant of
the proceedings to obtain new trial or appeal and the time limits governing both; and that
he did not possess the requisite skill or knowledge properly to conduct an appeal, . . .
[and thus] it was-as a practical matter-impossible for him to obtain relief by appeal."
Id. at 467.
208. See infra notes 238-63 and accompanying text.
209. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68.
210. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
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pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. 211

Lest Johnson be misunderstood as relaxing the strict limitations on the
availability of relief through federal habeas corpus, Justice Black
qualified the decision by adding that "[i]t must be remembered,
however, that a judgment can not be lightly set aside by collateral
attack, even on habeas corpus. "212 Justice Black emphasized that,
"[w]hen collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carrie[d] with it a
presumption of regularity," and clarified that the burden of proof rested
squarely on the individual seeking the writ to establish "by a
preponderance of evidence" that "the trial court did not have jurisdiction
to proceed to judgment and conviction" because the petitioner had "not
competently and intelligently waive[d] his right to counsel. " 213 Thus,
merely four years prior to Quirin, even as the Johnson Court
significantly expanded federal criminal defendants' constitutional rights,
it assiduously labored to preserve the Watkins rule that habeas corpus
relief would be available for one confined under a judicial judgment
only when the court that issued the judgment had lacked jurisdiction. 214
This was the law's state when three months before Quirin, the
Court used a terse per curiam opinion for all participating Justices to
acknowledge openly for the first time that the writ could, in rare
circumstances, lawfully be granted for serious errors not deemed
"jurisdictional." Waley v. Johnston 215 was an inauspicious case, in
which a pro se prisoner serving a sentence at Alcatraz sought leave to
proceed in forma pauperis before the Supreme Court; the U.S.
government even confessed error in response to his habeas corpus
petition alleging that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by an FBI
agent's brutal threats. 216 The district court had denied the petition for
211. Id. at 468 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted).
214. In Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, the Court confirmed that properly
pied factual questions relating to the voluntariness of a habeas corpus petitioner's waiver
of the right to counsel or trial necessitated a hearing prior to disposition, reversing the
district court's dismissal in reliance solely on ex parte affidavits denying the petitioner's
perhaps improbable factual assertions. Id. at 286 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. 458).
215. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
216. See id. at 103-04. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that, although
"threats of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents to throw [him] out of a window and
beat [him] up didn't bother" him, his guilty plea to kidnapping charges "had been
induced by the threats of a named Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to publish false
statements and manufacture false evidence that the kidnap[p]ed person had been injured,
and by such publications and false evidence to incite the public and to cause the State of
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the writ, even though the warden's return included no denial of these
specific allegations of coercion, and the court of appeals affirmed this
denial on the grounds that the petitioner's claims could not be addressed
in a habeas corpus proceeding. 217 The Supreme Court, however,
accepted the government's confession of error and reversed, concluding
that the claim of coercion "was appropriately raised by the habeas
corpus petition. "218
The facts relied on are dehors the record and their effect on the
judgment was not open to consideration and review on appeal.
In such circumstances the use of the writ in the federal courts
to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is

not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction
is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It
extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction
has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of
preserving his rights. 219
Given the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court's disposition in
Waley is unremarkable. Yet some commentators, seizing upon the
emphasized language and reading it in light of later developments, have
concluded that Waley marked the demise of the Watkins rule related to
jurisdiction. 220
Indeed, decisions that the Supreme Court issued over the second
half of the twentieth century substantiated this reading of Waley as the
Washington to hang the petitioner and the other defendants." Id. at 102 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
217. See id. at 103-04.
218. Id. at 104.
219. Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 148, at 354 (stating that in Waley "the
Supreme Court abandoned the overstrained jurisdictional fiction" and that "[d]espite the
language about 'exceptional cases' in the passage [quoted in the text accompanying supra
note 219], it is now clear that habeas corpus in federal court is available whenever [a]
state proceeding fails to meet the standards of procedural fairness that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires of the states"). Indeed, to his present chagrin, one of this Article's
authors recently reiterated this same overstatement of Waley's significance, albeit in the
context of an attempt at succinct summary of the writ's evolution on American soil as
background for an analysis of a federal 1996 statute. See Bryant, supra note 148, at 5-6
(asserting that "[i]n 1942, the Court abandoned the fiction that the writ was limited to
convictions void for want of jurisdiction"). As we note in the text, though this
observation serves adequately when made part of a historical landscape painted with a
relatively broad brush, it is, for present purposes, too anticipatory of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions to stand as an accurate comment on the state of the law circa
1942.
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commencement of the last chapter in the jurisdiction rule. 221 As part of
an effort to recover the precise state of habeas corpus law circa 1942,
however, a reading that equates Waley with the jurisdiction rule's
abandonment accords this brief, unsigned, and uncontested opinion
considerably more weight than it alone can bear. As we have seen, the
limitation of habeas corpus relief to defects which deprived the
sentencing court of jurisdiction was rooted in English common law,
expressly incorporated into the 1679 Act, acknowledged as part of U.S.
law in Chief Justice Marshall's 1830 Watkins opinion, and meticulously
preserved by innumerable Supreme Court rulings on the proper scope of
the writ issued over the more than eleven decades between Watkins and
Waley. 222 Accordingly, we conclude that the rule's interment would
have required considerably more elaboration and sparked much greater
controversy than appears in the laconic decision which sufficed for the
Waley Court. The very use of a per curiam opinion shows that the
Justices found Waley insufficiently significant to warrant a full-dress
opinion, let alone to serve as the vehicle for a radical change in habeas
corpus law.
Moreover, both post-Waley scholarship and Supreme Court rulings
evidence that Waley was not understood in the early to mid-1940s as
announcing a wholesale departure from the jurisdiction rule. First, in
1945 a special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General published an essay
on "Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts" in the Boston
University L<lw Review. 223 This thorough effort to describe what the
author termed "an entirely new and hitherto unknown form of review in
criminal cases," which in "recent years . . . ha[d] been rapidly
developing in Federal jurisprudence," and had been expanding the scope
of the issues that could be raised on habeas corpus, concluded that the
"Supreme Court nevertheless continued its adherence to the fundamental
principles. " 224 These "fundamental principles" included the rule "that if
the petitioner [was] incarcerated pursuant to a judgment of conviction
for a crime, resort [could] be had to a writ of habeas corpus only if the
judgment (was] void because the court was without jurisdiction to render
it. " 225 The author elaborated that the Court had in the first half of the
twentieth century expanded the scope of review available through a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus by means of "a far-reaching

221.
222.
223.
corpus cases
35.
224.
225.

See infra notes 237-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155-214 and accompanying text.
See Holtzoff, supra note 179, at 26. The essay treated federal habeas
challenging criminal convictions in both federal and state courts. See id. at
Id. at26-27,40.
Id. at 40.
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enlarg[e]ment of the traditional concepts of jurisdiction and jurisdictional
facts. " 226 The Court had, however, not departed "from the timehonored principle that lack of jurisdiction is the only question open for
consideration on a petition for habeas corpus presented by a person
confined pursuant to a judgment in a criminal case. " 227 The author's
analysis of countless lower federal court cases decided in the late 1930s
and early 1940s similarly demonstrated the vitality of the jurisdiction
rule as a limit on the writ's scope. 228
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Sunal v. La.rge
confirmed this scholarly assessment two years later. 229 When Justice
Douglas explained the Court's denial of habeas corpus relief to two
people imprisoned following their convictions in federal court for
criminal draft evasion, he addressed in detail the limits on the writ as
they had evolved over the previous half century. Frankly recognizing
that the Court had carved out "exceptions" to "the general rule ... that
the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an
appeal, " 230 Justice Douglas found it "plain, however, that the writ is not
designed for collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial
court . . . which do not cross the jurisdictional line. "231 The Sunal
petitioners had been improperly denied any opportunity to challenge in
their criminal prosecutions the local draft board's classification of them
as eligible for military service. 232 Nevertheless, Justice Douglas relied
on the above-quoted principle to hold that habeas corpus relief was
inappropriate because the trial court's error did not deprive it of
226 . Id. at 41.
227 . Id.
228. Id. at 45-46. After an exhaustive, and exhausting, review of federal circuit
and district court cases from the period, the author summarized their collective
significance as follows:
While extending the use of habeas corpus as indicated and sanctioned by the
cases that have been reviewed, the courts nevertheless continued to recognize
and adhere to the principle that errors at trial will not be reviewed and will
not vitiate a conviction on habeas corpus, unless the error led to a failure of
the trial court to obtain jurisdiction or to a divesting of jurisdiction by
subsequent events. The traditional concept of what constitutes jurisdiction
has been greatly expanded. In order, however, to render a judgment
vulnerable on habeas corpus, the defect must be jurisdictional, as that term is
now interpreted. It is not even every denial of constitutional right that
renders the conviction subject to collateral attack. It is only such a
deprivation of a constitutional right as affects the jurisdiction of the trial
court that vitiates the judgment and makes it vulnerable on habeas corpus.
Id.
229. 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
230. Id. at 178.
231. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 176.
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jurisdiction. 233 Justice Douglas succinctly summarized the Court's
rationale for denying the writ of habeas corpus in the following terms:
"The courts which tried the defendants had jurisdiction over their
persons and over the offense. They committed an error of law in
excluding the defense which was tendered. That error did not go to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. "234 To be sure, Justices Frankfurter,
Rutledge, and Murphy all dissented on the ground that the majority had
applied the habeas corpus precedents with insufficient flexibility, which
they believed should have been construed as permitting relief whenever
issuance of the writ was necessary to prevent a "complete miscarriage of
justice. " 235 Of course, the dissenters' failure to prevail emphasizes the
narrower majority view of the writ's availability. Moreover, the
subsequent substantial vindication of the dissenters' position by Supreme
Court rulings issued in the second half of the twentieth century does not
undercut the fact that much stricter limits on the writ retained their
authority in the 1940s. 236
In brief, by the summer of 1942, centuries of authority, first
English and then American, supported the rule that the writ of habeas
corpus would be denied to a petitioner, unless the petitioner could
establish that the court which issued the judgment lacked jurisdiction.
Throughout the previous six decades, federal courts in the United States
had intermittently adopted broad interpretations of the term
233. Id. at 181.
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 187 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also id. at 188 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); id. at 193 (noting that
Justice Murphy joined in Justice Rutledge's dissent).
236. Moreover, neither of the dissenting opinions in Sunal accused the majority
of improperly repudiating an anti-jurisdictional revolution wrought in Waley. To the
contrary, the dissenting Justices emphasized the confusion and inconsistency in the
Court's habeas corpus precedents, arguing that this very lack of jurisprudential clarity
permitted the Court to render justice for the petitioners before it within the uncertain
boundaries of existing law. See Sunal, 332 U.S. at 184-85, 187 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 188-89 (Rutledge, J., dissenting):
Confusion in the opinions there is, in quantity. But it arises in part from the
effort to pin down what by its nature cannot be confined in special, allinclusive categories, unless the office of the writ is to be diluted or destroyed
where that should not happen. And so limitation in assertion gives way to
the necessity for achieving the writ's historic purpose when the two collide.
Admirable as may be this effort toward system, this last resort for human
liberty cannot yield when the choice is between tolerating its wrongful
deprivation and maintaining the systematist's art.
The dissenters' assertions that, as of 1947, the state of the law governing the availability
of the writ was anything but clear provides additional evidence that the Court's April
1942 per curiam opinion in Waley did not of its own force throw off the long-honored
rule that the writ would issue only to redress errors deemed to deprive the criminal trial
court of jurisdiction.

Quirin Revisited

2003:309

349

"jurisdiction" for these purposes, but the Supreme Court's eventual
abandonment of this limitation only happened well after the Court
confronted and denied the petitions for the writ filed on behalf of the
Nazi saboteurs in 1942. The present significance of this observation
about the legal context in which the Quirin Court ruled is explored in
Part IV. However, we first briefiy summarize the Supreme Court's
significant expansion of federal habeas corpus during the sixty years
since Quirin was decided.

B.

Growth of Federal Habeas Corpus Since 1942

The story of the writ's expansion in the second half of the twentieth
century can be treated with much greater brevity than its pre-Quirin
history, as the more recent events are comparatively familiar and less
controversy surrounds their proper description. 237 In short, the doctrinal
change which Waley only tentatively suggested became the law of the
land. The Court ultimately abandoned the Watkins jurisdictional rule
and authorized the writ's use to remedy serious errors in criminal justice
administration regardless of whether these errors undermined the
committing court's jurisdiction over the offense or the offender.
In 1948, Congress substantially revised the sections of the U.S.
Code that authorized and regulated the federal courts' power to issue the
writ. 238 For present purposes, this statutory revision effected two
significant changes. First, it substituted a statutory remedy (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2255) for the writ of habeas corpus as the means for federal
prisoners to vindicate legitimate challenges to federal court judgments
ordering imprisonment. 239 We explore below the significance that this
development had for understanding the Court's subsequent expansion of
the writ. The second aspect of the 1948 revision that is important for
our purposes was Congress's codification of the judicially created rule
that a state prisoner must exhaust all available state avenues for relief
before a federal court may consider the prisoner's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 240 This exhaustion requirement in turn presented the
Court with the issue whether, and if so to what extent, a federal court
237. Controversy abounds as to the normative implications of the writ's post1940s expansion. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 148, at 27-28 (noting the controversy
sparked by the Court's expansion of the writ in the 1950s and 60s). But few would
contest the factual assertion that, as a result of the normatively controversial Supreme
Court rulings in the 1950s and 60s, the federal courts issued the writ of habeas corpus
far more frequently in the late-twentieth century than in prior eras.
238. See, e.g.' HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 1341.
239. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1952) (discussing the
background to Congress's 1948 creation of the § 2255 remedy).
240. See, e.g.' HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 1443-44.
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should accord preclusive effect to prior state court rejection of a
petitioner's federal constitutional claim. 241 When the Justices addressed
this issue in their 1953 landmark ruling in Brown v. Allen, 242 the Court
finally and decisively repudiated the Watkins rule that the writ of habeas
corpus would be available only if the error alleged by the petitioner had
undermined the committing court's jurisdiction.
In Brown, three North Carolina prisoners filed, in federal district
court, petitions for the writ on the basis of federal constitutional claims
that the North Carolina courts had previously considered and rejected.
Denying the petitions, the federal district judge observed that "[t]he
petitioner[s] ha[d] [their] day in Court and [their] present positions have
been rejected by a Court which had and did not lose jurisdiction. "243
The district judge found dispositive "the procedural history and the
record in the State Courts, for the reason that [a] habeas corpus
proceeding is not available to the petitioner for the purpose of raising the
identical question passed upon in those Courts. "244 The district judge
explained that in such a case "[t]he judgment of the state court is
ordinarily res adjudicata, not only of those issues which were raised and
determined, but also of those which might have been raised. "245 The
court rejected the petitioner's argument that the 1867 statute, which
empowered the federal courts to grant state prisoners the writ, mandated
an exception to the general rule that "adjudications made by the state
courts in connection with applications made to them will be binding on
the federal courts" in subsequent proceedings. 246

241. Another issue raised by the exhaustion requirement, and addressed by
numerous Supreme Court decisions, was when should a state court's dismissal of a
prisoner's claim for failure to comply with state procedures bar a federal habeas corpus
court's consideration of the claim's merits. That issue is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a helpful overview of the problem, see CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 151, §
15.5.2. A related question is when will a prisoner who files successive petitions for the
writ be denied relief for this reason alone, that is without inquiry into the merits of the
prisoner's claim. For a discussion of this issue, see id. § 15.4.3. See generally Randal
S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of I996: Emerging Procedural and
Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2000); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of
Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699 (2002).
242. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see also CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 151, § 15.5.3, at
896-97 (discussing Brown). For a recent re-examination of the significance of Brown,
see Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part Ill, Brown v. Allen: The
Habeas Corpus Revolution that Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000).
243. Brown v. Crawford, 98 F. Supp. 866, 867 (E.D.N.C. 1951).
244. Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D.N.C. 1951).
245. Id. at 95-96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
246. Id. at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Frankfurter, however, in an opinion endorsed by a majority
of the Court, 247 adopted the petitioner's argument. Answering his call
for Supreme Court clarification and liberalization of the federal habeas
corpus court's role in his Sunal dissent, Justice Frankfurter concluded
that the 1867 statute required federal district courts to decide de novo
both pure questions of federal constitutional law and mixed questions of
law and fact when they were properly presented by a petition for habeas
corpus, even if the trial and appellate courts of the incarcerating state
had previously rejected petitioner's claims.
Justice Frankfurter
emphasized his solicitude for the state courts charged, in the first
instance in most cases, with the awesome responsibility of administering
criminal justice. 248 He, nonetheless, concluded that Congress's decision
to extend the federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction to petitions
brought by state prisoners compelled a ruling that "the prior State
determination of a claim under the U.S. Constitution cannot foreclose
consideration of such a claim" by a federal habeas corpus court. 249
Although the Court's holding in Brown was, and has remained,
controversial, 250 on the point central to our inquiry, a majority of the
Justices made blindingly clear that the Court had abandoned the Watkins
jurisdiction rule. Henceforth, a federal court exercising habeas corpus
jurisdiction could address the merits of a petitioner's federal
constitutional challenge to a state-court criminal conviction, even though
a state court of competent jurisdiction had previously considered and
247. Although Justice Reed delivered the "opinion of the Court" resolving the
three consolidated appeals before the Court in Brown v. Allen, Justices Black, Douglas,
Burton, and Clark endorsed Justice Frankfurter's discussion of "the bearing of the
proceedings in the State courts upon the disposition of the application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Federal District Courts." Brown, 344 U.S. at 497 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 513 (opinion of Justices Black
and Douglas); id. at 487-88 (opinion of Justices Burton and Clark).
Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Brown has been recognized as authoritative by both the Court,
see, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 288 (1992) (plurality); id. at 300 (O'Connor,
J., concurring), and commentators, see, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at
1356-57.
248. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 497-98:
Experience may be summoned to support the belief that most claims in these
attempts to obtain review of State convictions are without merit. Presumably
they are adequately dealt with in the State courts. Again, no one can feel
more strongly than 1 do that a casual, unrestricted opening of the doors of
the federal courts to these claims not only would cast an undue burden upon
those courts, but would also disregard our duty to support and not weaken
the sturdy enforcement of their criminal laws by the States.
249. Id. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that under a contrary holding "the State court would have the final say which the
Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not have").
250. For a discussion of the controversy sparked by Brown, in both Congress
and legal academia, see Bryant, supra note 148, at 27-29.
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rejected that same challenge. 251
Only Justice Jackson, writing
separately, indicated that he would have preserved the rule of
jurisdiction as a limitation on federal habeas corpus review of state
convictions. 252 The 1953 decision in Brown clarified that federal habeas
corpus relief extended to state court errors of federal constitutional law,
regardless of whether the errors were deemed to have affected the state
court's jurisdiction or whether a federal habeas corpus proceeding was
the only available avenue for relief.
The Supreme Court waited another sixteen years to elucidate that
the same liberal principles, articulated in Brown, controlled the
availability of collateral relief to a prisoner incarcerated under the
sentence of a federal criminal court. In this period, the lower federal
courts had divided, and many had held that relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 would not be available for claims that had been, or could have
been, raised in a direct appeal from the federal conviction. 253 In
Kaufma.n v. United States, 254 the Supreme Court finally rejected this
distinction and recognized a parity between the relief available to state
prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings and that available to
251. See generally Bator, supra note 147, at 499-500. Other commentators
have perceptively observed that the Court's decision in Brown proved essential to the
Warren Court's 1960s reformation of the criminal justice system within the States. The
Supreme Court lacked the capacity to review and reverse every state court conviction
that contravened its increasingly generous interpretations of the Bill of Rights.
Accordingly, the federal district courts, exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction, assumed
responsibility for guaranteeing faithful adherence to the Supreme Court's rulings. As one
commentator put the matter:
the growth in the size of the country and the amount of litigation meant that
review by the United States Supreme Court was not sufficient to remedy all
allegedly unconstitutional convictions. If there was to be federal court
review of state court procedures, it would have to be undertaken primarily in
the district courts through habeas corpus.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, § 15.2, at 847; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note
126, at 1361 ("The broad scope of habeas relitigation authorized in Brown and
reaffirmed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), is often seen as an important or even
necessary aspect of the Warren Court's effort to ensure that its criminal procedure
decisions were followed by state courts."); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Coun, 86 YALE L.J. 1035,
1041 (1977) (explaining that "an expanded federal writ of habeas corpus" provided a
"remedial counterpart to the constitutionalization of criminal procedure"); Barry
Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247, 253-54 (1988) ("[T)he Court
expanded the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in Brown because the Court recognized
that it no longer could shoulder the burden on direct review of scrutinizing constitutional
claims arising in state criminal proceedings.").
252. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 544-45 (Jackson, J., concurring).
253. See DUKER, supra note 147, at 259 n.189 (citing lower federal court
decisions).
254. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
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federal prisoners in § 2255 cases, the remedial mechanism enacted by
Congress in 1948 as a substitute for federal prisoner petitions for writs
of habeas corpus. 255
That the ambiguity regarding § 2255's scope persisted for so long
shows that the reformulation and expansion of habeas corpus in Brown
was a dramatic one, extended to the closely analogous proceedings
under § 2255 only after much time and deliberate consideration as well
as Supreme Court resolution of a longstanding disagreement among the
lower federal courts. This delay, if not reluctance, in embracing the
theoretical implications of Brown reveals that habeas corpus's narrow
conception, which was captured most clearly by the Watkins
requirement that the committing court be found to have lacked
jurisdiction before the writ would issue, echoed through the case law
well into the second half of the twentieth century. The staying power
which this cramped view of the writ thus displayed provides additional
evidence for our thesis that the narrowness of Supreme Court scrutiny in
Quirin comported with the then-dominant understanding of the writ.
This history further undermines the Bush administration's argument that
this same narrowness reflected instead the Court's deliberate
endorsement of a de minimus judicial role in reviewing any detention or
punishment ordered by presidentially authorized military commissions.
Additional post-Brown Supreme Court opinions reaffirmed and
extended the principle that the federal writ of habeas corpus would
generally be available to remedy constitutional errors infecting criminal
convictions. Perhaps chief among these rulings is the Supreme Court's
decision in Fay v. Noia. 256 The Court held that a habeas corpus
petitioner could raise constitutional challenges to a state-court criminal
conviction which were not previously presented to the state courts, as
long as the petitioner had not "deliberately by-passed . . . the state
courts. "257 For present purposes, even more important than this
generous holding2 58 was the unwavering commitment to a broad
conception of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction evidenced by Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court. Justice Brennan wrote of "the
extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ," which he insisted had
255. Id. at 220-22.
256. 372 U.S. 391. The Court on the same day also ruled in the companion
case to Noia, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which identified particular
circumstances in which a federal habeas corpus court might disregard state court factual
determinations. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 905.
257. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438.
258. Indeed, the precise holding of Noia was revisited and overruled implicitly
in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and this implicit overruling was in turn
made explicit in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). See generally
CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 149, at 882-86.
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provided "a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint
or confinement" for centuries. 259 The author conceded that the Supreme
Court "ha[d] [not] always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions
as to the availability of the Great Writ" and that its "development of the
law of federal habeas corpus ha[d] been attended, seemingly, with some
backing and filling;" yet Brennan found dominant the precedents for
reviewing habeas corpus petitioners' claims on their merits, which in his
estimation "overshadowed" the contrary decisions that accorded the writ
a more "grudging scope. "260 Therefore, Justice Brennan reaffirmed in
sweeping terms Brown's teaching that constitutional challenges to
criminal convictions could be relitigated in federal habeas corpus
proceedings: "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation
cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the
fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review. " 261
To be sure, the Warren Court's enlargement of the federal habeas
corpus writ experienced retrenchment during the tenures of Chief
Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist. 262
Despite the
significance of these developments for the categories of cases affected,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have not overruled Brown's holding
that constitutional challenges may generally be relitigated in federal
habeas corpus cases. 263 Moreover, there has been no hint that the
259. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 399-400.
260. Id. at 411-13. Thus, Justice Brennan's historical analysis, which firmly
rejected "the notion that until recently the writ was available only in a very narrow class
of lawless imprisonments," id. at 402-03, is in some respects at odds with our treatment
of this same history. Compare, e.g., supra notes 152-211 and accompanying text
(reading the Watkins decision as establishing a fundamental limit on federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction that survived, albeit in modified form, well into the twentieth
century), with Noia, 372 U.S. at 413-14 (asserting that "the fetters of the Watkins
decision were thrown off in Ex pane Lange," an 1873 Supreme Court decision). Nor
are we the first commentators to find unconvincing at least some aspects of the historical
narrative presented in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Noia. See, e.g.,
Forsythe, supra note 144, at 1165 (observing that Justice Brennan's "history" in Noia
has been "thoroughly disparaged by scholars"); Mayers, supra note 145, at 58 (rejecting
as "without historical foundation" Justice Brennan's assertion that the Court's ruling in
Noia "merely fulfill[ed] the intentions of the 1867 Congress"). Even though aspects of
Justice Brennan's history in Noia may be historically inaccurate, the Warren Court's
adoption of this revisionist account nevertheless evidences the Justices' commitment to
and entrenchment of the Brown rule permitting relitigation of constitutional claims in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
261. Noia, 372 U.S. at 424.
262. See supra note 258; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 847-48.
263. See generally 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES s. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 69-80 (4th ed. 2001) (providing overview of major
post-Brown developments in federal habeas corpus and concluding that, notwithstanding
some significant "contraction" of federal habeas corpus by both the Supreme Court and
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Supreme Court might return to the 1940s regime, in which the writ was
available to one confined under a criminal conviction if and only if the
committing court exceeded or lost its "jurisdiction" over the offense or
the alleged offender. Thus, the scope of review in federal habeas corpus
proceedings today remains substantially broader than that typical of the
period in which the Court decided Quirin. 264

lV. SIGNIFICANCE FOR PRESENT CONTROVERSIES
We surveyed above ubiquitous, albeit overbroad and unsupported,
reliance on Quirin as precedent by President Bush and numerous
additional public officials for many of the Bush administration's
controversial responses to the September 11 terrorist attacks. ln this
Section, we explore the present significance of our perspectives about
how incredibly narrow was the Supreme Court opinion and how
remarkably underdeveloped was the state of federal habeas corpus law
circa 1942.

A.

Relevance to Federal Judicial Review of Military Commission
Proceedings

Our observations perhaps have greatest relevance for White House
Counsel Gonzales's claim that any "habeas corpus proceeding in a
Congress, governing law generally "recognizes the continuing obligation of federal
habeas corpus courts to scrutinize state court rulings on federal constitutional claims
independently").
264. Though we have focused on the dramatic changes effected in the law of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction during the sixty years since the Supreme Court ruled
in Quirin, we recognize that other relevant areas of the law have likewise developed
significantly in the intervening decades. Perhaps most relevant to potential controversies
arising out of the Bush Order or the administration's prosecution of the war on terror are
the revolutionary changes that have arisen in the constitutional law of criminal procedure
and in the law governing the administration of military justice. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra
note 203, at 447-50 (discussing the numerous rulings that "left the contours of criminal
procedure radically altered by the time [Chief Justice] Warren left [the Supreme Court]
in 1969"). See generally JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1775-1980 (2001) (stressing the 1951
creation of the Court of Military Appeals, now known as the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces, as a landmark event in the development of modern military justice
law). International law and human rights have also dramatically expanded. See
Dickinson, supra note 8, at 1421-32. Thorough consideration of these and other
potentially relevant legal developments and their possible significance for present-day
controversies is beyond the scope of this article. We hope, however, that our focus on
the evolution of the law of federal habeas corpus during the last six decades will lead
others similarly to situate Quirin in the legal context in which the opinion was issued,
and to which it should be limited.
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federal court" challenging actions taken under the Bush Order, which
most prominently authorized trial of non-U .S. citizens by military
commissions, would be limited to reviewing "the lawfulness of the
commission's jurisdiction. "265 Mr. Gonzales justified this restriction on
the exercise of federal habeas corpus review with express reference to
Quirin, reasoning that, because the Court in this case framed its inquiry
vis-a-vis the legality of the jurisdiction asserted by the military
commission which President Roosevelt's 1942 Executive Order
authorized, federal habeas corpus review of any action taken under the
Bush Order would be similarly circumscribed. 266 This argument
assumes both that (1) the Quirin Court's review was unusually narrow,
excluding from judicial consideration all issues which concerned the
process employed against the petitioners, and (2) that the Justices
specially crafted this limitation on the scope of review for the
extraordinary circumstances of Quirin, thus reflecting the Court's
recognition that it owed enormous deference to the president's
invocation of military courts. However, careful assessment of the
Quirin opinion and clear understanding of the then-current state of
federal habeas corpus law belie both of these assumptions.
As we have shown above, the scope of Supreme Court review in
Quirin was considerably more searching than the jurisdictional label
might suggest. Perhaps most critical to the issues evaluated in this
Article, the Justices seriously entertained, and clearly resolved on the
merits, substantive claims which petitioners asserted under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. That treatment assumes even
greater import because the petitioners had stipulated to certain facts
which in essence admitted their guilt.
It is also important to understand that the Quirin Court, when
framing the inquiry in terms of the military commission's jurisdiction,
did not adopt a narrower scope of review than the scrutiny exercised for
more routine habeas corpus proceedings.
Rather, as Part III
demonstrated, in the early 1940s the federal habeas corpus writ was
generally unavailable to someone who was held under the judgment of a

265. Gonzales, supra note 6 (emphasis added). Mr. Gonzales's New York Times
essay provided in pertinent part: The Bush Order "preserves judicial review in civilian
courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a
military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's
jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. The language of the
order is similar to the language of a military tribunal order issued by President Franklin
Roosevelt that was construed by the Supreme Court to permit habeas corpus review."
Id.; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
266. Gonzales, supra note 6.
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court having competent jurisdiction. 267 The Justices' analysis in Quirin,
therefore, comported with the prevailing view of the writ's scope and
purpose, even as applied to one imprisoned under the final judgment of
a state or federal criminal court. The Quirin Court similarly limited its
review to the legality of the military commission's jurisdiction in
accordance with established federal habeas corpus practice, not as a
specially tailored narrowing of broader scrutiny available in less
constitutionally or politically sensitive cases. 268 Therefore, White House
Counsel Gonzales's observation that the Quirin Court restricted its
inquiry to the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction, although
technically accurate, does not support his conclusion that a federal
habeas corpus proceeding challenging the judgment of a military
commission authorized by the Bush Order should be similarly
circumscribed. To the contrary, an understanding of the legal context in
which the Justices decided Quirin teaches that the limitation on the
Court's review in the case to the issue of competent jurisdiction was
267. To be sure, the Supreme Court announced its judgment denying the
saboteurs' applications to petition for the writ three days before the military commission
convicted the petitioners and sentenced them to death. Belknap, supra note 12, at 47374. The Court had acquiesced to the parties' agreement whereby the trial before the
commission was temporarily halted to permit the Court to hear and rule on what was in
effect an expedited appeal from the federal district court's denial of relief. See White,
supra note 139, at 427-28 (observing that "both sides cooperated in shepherding Ex
parte Quirin to the Supreme Court while the saboteurs' trial was taking place" and
discussing the different motives that brought the parties together on this point of
procedure). One chilling reason the parties gave the Court for this odd procedural
inversion (whereby the petitions for the writ were presented and considered prior to the
commission's final judgment) was that, were defense counsel to follow the more typical
course and wait to petition for the writ until after the commission ruled, the petitioners
might be executed before any federal court had an opportunity to rule on their petitions!
Oral Argument Tr. at 500, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (statement of Colonel Royall, defense
counsel) ("[B]etween the time the Commission takes its action and the time the
Executive acts there is no period which anyone could safely count on between the
conclusion of the hearing before the Commission and the execution of any sentence that
might be imposed[.]"); id. at 505 (statement of Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General)
(noting as an additional reason for the Supreme Court's consideration of the merits in
Quirin, the "very practical reason which defense counsel has urged and will urge, that
even if an appeal be granted it might not act as a stay, and the case would very quickly
become moot"). In fact, a mere five days intervened between the commission's
conviction and sentencing of petitioners, and the execution of six of them in the District
of Columbia jail. Belknap, supra note 12, at 474. In any event, in Quirin the Court
took the unusual step of addressing petitions for the writ while trial was pending before
the military commission, in effect assuming for the purposes of its analysis (and quite
correctly, as it turned out) that the commission's ruling would be adverse to the
petitioners.
268. The Quirin Court did speak of deference to the President in wartime. See
supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text; infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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merely a non-controversial application of then-controlling precedents
concerning federal habeas corpus reliefs availability. In the intervening
decades, however, the Supreme Court has authoritatively repudiated
those habeas corpus precedents.
Modem federal courts should
recognize that the Justices' considerable expansion of the writ during the
last sixty years has modified Quirin while emphatically rejecting blind
adherence to this outmoded feature of Quirin in resolving any federal
habeas corpus cases that may arise out of the Bush Order.
As we detailed above, 269 a number of Supreme Court opinions
issued during the 1950s and 60s, most significantly the landmark ruling
of Brown v. Allen, 210 established that in cases which implicated the
legality of imprisonment ordered by judicial judgment, the writ's
availability henceforth would not be limited to those petitioners who
could establish that the committing court lacked competent jurisdiction.
Rather, with narrow exceptions, the writ would issue to any prisoner
who was confined under a judgment secured in violation of the U.S.
Constitution. 271 This expansion of the writ meant the federal courts
entertained many procedural challenges to criminal convictions that had
previously been excluded from federal habeas corpus proceedings
because they did not affect the committing court's jurisdiction, even as
the Justices had expanded that term in prior rulings. These doctrinal
innovations, together with the Warren Court's expansive interpretations
of the federal constitutional protections applicable to criminal
defendants; radically transformed the nature and importance of the
federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction. 272
A few instructive examples will suffice here in lieu of exhaustively
cataloging the kinds of claims judges addressed in post-Brown federal
habeas corpus proceedings, 273 which would not have been cognizable in
the early 1940s. As late as 1938, Justice Black had to exert phenomenal
intellectual force when justifying Supreme Court consideration in a
habeas corpus proceeding of whether a federal trial court's felony
conviction of an "ignorant" defendant altogether denied legal
representation was constitutional. 274 However, a frequent, important,
and well-established use of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction today
is in reviewing both state and federal prisoners' claims that their stateappointed counsel did not afford them constitutionally adequate

269. See supra Part III.B.
270. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
271. See supra Part lII .B.
272. See supra note 251.
273. A catalogue nearer to being complete can be found in 1 HERTZ &
supra note 263, § 9.1, at 414-56.
274. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.

LIEBMAN,
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assistance. 275
The charge that trial counsel's performance was
ineffective concomitantly serves as the vehicle for presenting to the
federal courts numerous questions concerning the fairness of a
petitioner's criminal trial. These include whether counsel properly
investigated all reasonable avenues of defense and presented all
potentially mitigating evidence to the trier of fact, 276 whether counsel
made timely efforts to suppress evidence apparently seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, 277 and whether the petitioner had appropriate
opportunities to confer with counsel before and during trial. 278 Ten
years ago, the Supreme Court confirmed that a petitioner's claim that his
self-incriminating statement had been obtained absent compliance with
the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona219 was cognizable in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding, 280 even though it would strain credulity to
contend that such an error deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over
the case. In 2001, the Justices reaffirmed that a petitioner held under a
judgment of conviction premised on evidence constitutionally
insufficient to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt could secure a writ. 281 This ruling underscores the
extent of the writ's expansion, given the frequent observation in preBrown Supreme Court opinions that "the writ is not designed for
collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial court," a
quintessential example of which was the lack "of any evidence to
support the conviction. "282
275. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (confirming that Sixth
Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable in federal habeas
corpus proceedings).
276. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (setting aside
petitioner's death sentence due to trial counsel's failure to present potentially mitigating
evidence at sentencing hearing).
277. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 374-75.
278. See, e.g., Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that trial court improperly precluded consultation between petitioner and trial counsel
during overnight recess).
279. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
280. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
281. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (per curiam); see also 1 HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 263, § 9.1, at 415 n.20 (citing cases). The Court's decision in
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), recognized one significant exception to Brown's
rule of relitigation. In Stone, the Court held that "where the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 494 (citation
and footnote omitted). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 897-98.
Though "[t]or a time it appeared that Stone might represent a first step to overruling
Brown v. Allen," subsequent Supreme Court decisions declined to extend Stone to other
constitutional rights. See id. at 901-02.
282. Sunal, 332 U.S. at 179.
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Our decision to enumerate these classic illustrations of the modem
writ's use should not be misunderstood as asserting that defendants
whom a military commission lawfully tried necessarily enjoy these or
other specific constitutional protections. However, we do insist that a
federal court with jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition brought by
such a defendant has the power to decide these questions on the merits.
An anachronistic reference to Quirin's consideration of whether the
Roosevelt administration military commission's jurisdiction was lawful
must not preclude a federal habeas corpus court from reviewing
constitutional challenges to the manner in which the military
commissions authorized by the Bush Order actually operate.
Although the myriad issues that will arise from any future Bush
Order military commission trials defy accurate prediction now, we can
identify a few questions which will probably arise. First, because Bush
administration regulations prescribe lax evidentiary standards, 283 a
military commission defendant may object that the admission of certain
suspect evidence violated the Fifth Amendment right to "due process of
law, "284 either because the challenged evidence was inherently unreliable
or because the defendant was denied any meaningful opportunity for
cross-examination. 285 A commission defendant may similarly challenge a
conviction on the grounds that it was not supported by constitutionally
sufficient evidence286 or was predicated on self-incriminating statements
alleged to have been extracted coercively .287 A defendant who is tried
before a military commission also may seek to challenge the
competence, independence, or both, of appointed defense counsel. 288 Of
283. See DOD Order, supra note 19, § 6(D)(l) (providing for the admission of
any evidence that "would have probative value to a reasonable person"). Indeed, Bush
administration officials have cited relaxed rules of evidence as a chief virtue of military
tribunals. See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 6 (observing that military commissions "can
consider the broadest range of relevant evidence to reach their verdicts" and that
"circumstances in a war zone often make it impossible to meet the authentication
requirements for documents in a civilian court").
284. U.S. CONST. amend. v.
285. The Bush administration's recent reliance on ex parte affidavits in the
Hamdi and Padilla litigation, see Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2003);
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), may foreshadow similar tactics in
cases to be tried before military commissions.
286. Cf Fiore, 531 U.S. 225 (per curiam) (holding that petitioner's claim that
his criminal conviction was based on evidence constitutionally insufficient to prove each
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt was cognizable in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 263, § 9 .1, at 415
n.20 (citing cases).
287. q. Withrow, 507 U.S. 680 (holding that petitioner's claim that his
Miranda rights had been violated was cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding).
288. q. DOD Order, supra note 19, § 4(C)(3)(b) (providing strictures for the
employment of civilian defense counsel); William Glaberson, Tribunal v. Court-Martial:

2003:309

Quirin Revisited

361

course, the same challenges might be lodged against the members of the
commission itself, which the administration's regulations provide will
include three military officers "[a]t least one [of which] ... shall have
experience as a judge. " 289 Even assuming that a defendant acquiesces to
tribunal composition and defense counsel's competence, the defendant
may challenge the adequacy of defense counsel resources and any limits
imposed on defense counsel's abilities to investigate and develop a
meaningful defense. 290 Another specific question is the extent to which
commission defendants enjoy a right to compulsory process and access
to any potentially exculpatory evidence possessed by the government. 291
These issues and a plethora of additional questions await resolution.
Indeed, we readily acknowledge that others who are more seasoned by
experience in criminal defense generally and in military law particularly
can delineate additional compelling issues which may well arise.
Moreover, circumstances will undoubtedly present issues that no one
can imagine at this juncture. Even so, this admittedly partial list of
plausible claims evidences the critical nature of the question this Article
treats-whether a federal court may rule on such issues when presented
in the context of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus otherwise
within its statutory jurisdiction. Contrary to Mr. Gonzales's assertion,
Quirin does not preclude a federal court from providing the ultimate
answers.

B.

Relevance to Judicial Review of Executive Detention of United
States Citizens

In recent federal court litigation challenging the Bush
administration's extrajudicial detention of U.S. citizens Jose Padilla and
Matter of Perception, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at B6 (observing that defendants
before an ordinary court-martial are allowed to select their own counsel, whereas
defendants tried by a Bush Order military commission may not be allowed to do so).
289. DOD Order, supra note 19, § 6(H)(4); see also Are Tribunal Rules Fair?,
WASH. POST, Mar. 25. 2002, at Al8; Richard A. Serrano, Terror Trials Would Mimic
Courts-Martial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al.
290. See DOD Order, supra note 19, § 5(H) (providing that "[t]he Accused may
obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused's defense, to the extent necessary and
reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer").
291. Compare DOD Order, supra note 19, § 5(E) (stating that "[t]he
Prosecution shall provide the Defense with access to evidence . . . known to the
Prosecution that tends to exculpate the Accused"), with id. § 6(D)(5) (authorizing the
presiding officer to deny defense counsel access to "Protected Information," defined
broadly), and id. § 10 (declaring that "[t]his Order is not intended to and does not create
any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party
. . . . No provision in this Order shall be construed to be a requirement of the United
States Constitution").
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Yaser Hamdi, counsel for the administration has again relied
substantially on Quirin as precedent for sharply circumscribing federal
judicial review. 292 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
partly acquiescing to the administration's litigation position, found their
roles in scrutinizing the administration's detention decisions to be
exceedingly narrow and deferential ones. 293
The stimulus for this article was the Bush Order, which by its terms
does not apply to Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla, who are apparently U.S.
citizens. Thus, we have only preliminarily considered the implications
of our study for their pending cases. Nevertheless, we think that our
treatment of the Quirin precedent speaks to the controversy surrounding
the detentions of Hamdi and Padilla as well.
For these petitioners, the assiduously narrow character of Chief
Justice Stone's opinion has telling import. Indeed, Judge Mukasey
conceded as much in his careful, thorough Padilla ruling, when he
observed that "[b]ecause the facts in Quirin were stipulated," the
decision "offer[ed] no guidance regarding the standard to be applied in
making the threshold determination that a habeas corpus petitioner is an
unlawful combatant. " 294 Yet Judge Mukasey then adopted a highly
deferential standard to review Padilla's potentially indefinite detentionwhether "some evidence" supported the executive branch determination
that Padilla was properly classified as an unlawful combatant. 295 To
substantiate this limited judicial role, Judge Mukasey relied primarily on
an extended quotation from the Fourth Circuit's Hamdi decision issued
earlier the same year, which had concomitantly invoked a broad reading
of Quirin as support for the proposition that "the President's wartime
detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the
courts. " 296
To be sure, Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Quirin recognized that
"the detention and trial of petitioners [the Nazi saboteurs]-ordered by
the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in
Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger-are not to
be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally
See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
The Fourth Circuit acquiesced more than the Southern District of New
York. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
294. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607; see also supra notes 104-05 and accompanying
text.
295. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
296. Id. at 606 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hamdi, 296 F.3d at
282). Judge Mukasey also relied on dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2001 ruling
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
292.
293.
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enacted" 297-a proposition itself beyond dispute. However, the Quirin
Court's acknowledgement of the grave context in which it ruled should
not obscure either how narrow the Court's holding was or that it found
review of the executive action taken, including consideration of
constitutional challenges to this action, consistent with the judicial role.
Insofar as the Bush administration or the lower federal courts have read
Quirin as expressing a mood of near prostrate deference by the judiciary
to Executive Branch detention decisions in times of perceived crisis, our
analysis of Quirin and the historical and legal context in which the Court
acted suggests that this reading of the opinion improperly and
dangerously extends, rather than merely applies, the precedent. Instead,
properly understanding Quirin requires meaningful judicial review to the
full extent permitted by the prevailing law of federal habeas corpus
while at once wisely counseling against precipitous intervention in
matters of national security.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the once
relatively obscure Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Quirin has
become critical to legal and constitutional debates about civil liberties'
import during times of international terror. The Bush administration has
frequently invoked the ruling to support its numerous aggressive
assertions regarding authority to wage a war on terrorism. Our primary
focus is the contention by the Bush administration that the Quirin
precedent limits a federal habeas corpus proceeding which challenges a
military commission order to the threshold question of whether
commission jurisdiction over the defendant and the alleged offense is
lawful, although we also briefly treat administration reliance on Quirin
in recent filings that implicate the Hamdi and Padilla cases.
Our review of the Quirin opinion and of the legal context in which
the Court issued it contests the administration's assertion that the case
mandates such an extremely narrow judicial role. Careful study of the
history, arguments, and most importantly Chief Justice Stone's opinion,
reveals that Supreme Court review of President Roosevelt's commitment
of the matter to a military commission was neither as limited nor as
deferential as the Bush administration has suggested. Moreover, by
recovering the state of federal habeas corpus law circa 1942, we
demonstrate that the Supreme Court's characterization of its role as
assessing the military commission's "jurisdiction" was consonant with
then-current understandings of the proper scope of inquiry in any federal

297.

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
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habeas corpus proceeding, including those which involved petitions filed
by prisoners incarcerated under federal and state judicial judgments.
That the Court declined to accord President Roosevelt's military
commission any less deference than it gave a lone state or federal trial
court judge in 1942 must not be anachronistically construed as a
definitive ruling that judicial review is singularly inappropriate when the
judgments of military commissions are at issue. Rather, Quirin should
be limited to its extraordinary facts, as Chief Justice Stone's opinion for
the Court clearly stated, and understood as a relic of an unduly narrow
and long-abandoned approach to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.

